Schopenhauer, the affects and the worst of all possible worlds
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378665897Keywords:
Afetos, Paixões, PessimismoAbstract
In opposition to Leibniz's optimism, Schopenhauer states, in the Complements to The World as Will and Representation, that we live in the "worst of all possible worlds", because a "little bit worse" it could not subsist. Misery is already given in its exact measure, as the pessimistic philosopher had affirmed in his thesis on the quota of suffering, presented in Volume 1 of the aforementioned work. The most immediate cause of this misfortune, he says, are vehement affects and violent passions. These two affections, always cited followed by their respective attributes, are presented when the philosopher refers to a certain "inordinacy" of activity of Will that leads the individual to error, violence, and pain. It is a matter then of verifying the exact configuration of these two concepts, their differences and importance for the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the negation of the will. It will be seen that the affects and passions are inclinations, irresistible excitations, which make it impossible to present countermotives and, consequently, intellectual freedom: either sudden inclinations (affects) or deeply rooted inclinations (passions).
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