FINALISTIC CONTROL OF TAX INCENTIVES FROM THE AIM OF LAW IN SCOTT SHAPIRO’S THEORY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to the improvement of the control of tax incentives in Brazilian law. In this field, in which taxes are handled beyond revenue collection, it is noticed low normative density in constitutional and legal provisions on finalistic control. It is intended to critically analyze this topic from the central thesis of Scott Shapiro's theory of law, namely, the moral aim thesis. To this end, the paper is divided in three sections: a) in the first, the moral aim thesis is presented; b) in the second, the importance of a tax incentive control with a finalistic perspective is sustained from its classification as public policy; c) in the third, it is analyzed if the current normative design of this control contributes to the purpose that characterize a legal system. It is concluded that the low incentive to the participation of external agents makes the current system on finalistic control deviates from the fundamental purpose of the law.