THE NEED FOR RECOGNITION AND THE LIMITS OF A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE

Abstract

The present article seeks to present, in the light of Honneth's thought, the criticisms and limitations about a theory of liberal justice. The main objective of this research is demonstrate that the texture of justice is based on intersubjectively recognized social relations that are constituted of practices with moral content. For that, first, the components of a liberal theory of justice are analyzed based on the arguments of John Rawls. After this, the pillars of liberalism are subjected to a critical examination. Then, Honneth's theory is presented in order to draw answers to the limitations and inadequacies of the liberal matrix. The conclusion is to rethink justice beyond the abstract dimension, in order to highlight the need of a critical reconstruction of the fragments of moral and political norms and principles already subscribed, even though partially, in the social reality itself as a long-term process of ethical-normative learning. From the methodological point of view, the research is based on critical theory and is basically bibliographical.