Is there an anticipation of Schopenhauer's Will in Leibniz's metaphysics?

Abstract

In the Fragments for the History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer asserts that Gottfried W. Leibniz’s thesis, which holds that matter and spirit share a common principle, can be regarded as a "presentiment" of his own metaphysics. The point of convergence between these two philosophies lies in the notion of substantial form, which suggests that the functioning of matter is not limited to mechanical or chemical laws but must be understood through metaphysical principles. In this article, I propose to explore the meanings of Schopenhauer’s assertion by analyzing Leibnizian concepts such as substantial form, force, pre-established harmony, expression, and monad. The aim is to highlight possible parallels between these

concepts and Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of nature, which views the material world as the objectification of the Will. I argue that Leibniz’s concept of force, essential to understanding substantial form, opens the door to a dialogue with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics because it points to a primordial metaphysical activity that, while expressed in the physical order and capable of being mathematized by the sciences, is not itself physical in nature. Similarly, in Schopenhauer's framework, the material world is understood through the metaphysics of the Will, with matter serving as the stage where the various degrees of its objectification become perceptible.