A kantian answer to the critics practiced by Schopenhauer against the terms "purpose in itself", "absolute value" and "dignity"

Authors

  • Emanuel Lanzini Stobbe Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina, PR

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378633707

Keywords:

Kant, Schopenhauer, Zweck an sich selbst, Absoluter Wert, Würde des Menschen

Abstract

This article aims to discuss the criticisms made by Schopenhauer against the Kantian terms “purpose in themselves”, “absolute value” and “human dignity” with the intention of writing a possible Kantian answer. With regard to such reviews, we will look at his article on the basis of morality, especially its eighth section. In his opinion, such three terms are "thoughts" that make no sense. Against Schopenhauer's claims, it is possible to give a Kantian answer: First, with regard to a meaning of the words "purpose" and "value" that Schopenhauer did not pay attention to, which will allow us to think both terms correctly in the Kantian sense and to understand; secondly, that such a consideration of both terms will also allow the concept of dignity to be understood as no contradictio in adjecto; and thirdly, that the two previous points show that Schopenhauer's criticisms noted here are ineffective against the Kantian moral philosophy.

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Author Biography

Emanuel Lanzini Stobbe, Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina, PR

Masterstudent in Philosophie (Stipendiat des CAPES).

References

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STOBBE, Emanuel Lanzini. A natureza racional como fim em si mesmo: an|lise e discussão sobre o conceito kantiano de “fim em si mesmo” na Fórmula da Humanidade. 2016. 96 S. Abschlussarbeit (Philosophie) – Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina, 2016.

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Published

2016-12-01

How to Cite

Stobbe, E. L. (2016). A kantian answer to the critics practiced by Schopenhauer against the terms "purpose in itself", "absolute value" and "dignity". Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), 96–110. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378633707