Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Latin American Cold War: the 1954 Guatemalan Coup d'état.

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the role of Brazilian diplomacy during the 1954 coup d’état in Guatemala. The research addresses the following central question: how and why did the government of Getúlio Vargas, in the context of the Cold War, support the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954? The main objective is to analyze why the Brazilian delegation participated in the efforts to legitimize the intervention within the framework of the Organization of American States and the United Nations Security Council. The article also briefly examines the domestic political scenario in Brazil under Vargas’s second administration (1951–1954), marked by tensions between nationalist and conservative forces, as well as Cold War pressures that reinforced the anti-communist agenda. In parallel, it discusses the Guatemalan context, defined by the so-called democratic spring, social reforms, and the agrarian reform implemented by Arbenz, which intensified the opposition of local elites and U.S. interests in the region. Methodologically, the study adopts a documentary and exploratory approach, drawing on primary sources such as telegrams, resolutions, and diplomatic speeches, in addition to specialized bibliography. The findings suggest that Brazil’s stance toward the coup reflected a preferential alignment with the United States, albeit with nuances of pragmatism and economic bargaining, and at the cost of endorsing the overthrow of a legitimately elected government.