The descriptive and the normative: oscillations within moral psychology in light of the social intuitionist model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378692063Keywords:
Naturalistic ethics, Moral psychology, Normativity, Social intuitionismAbstract
Based on emerging research in diverse disciplines such as experimental psychology, neuroscience, and primatology, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt developed a model of psychological moral judgment formation that contrasts with more traditional rationalist approaches, known as "social intuitionism." This model argues that psychological moral judgments are generally caused by intuitions conditioned by emotional processes, not by moral reasoning. With social intuitionism, Haidt bridged the gap between discussions specific to scientific moral psychology and those specific to philosophical normative ethics. In this article, I will explore the oscillations between the descriptive and the normative assumed by the social psychologist in his arguments and explain why, in light of social intuitionism, this disciplinary connection is crucial for both contemporary moral psychology and philosophical ethics.
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