Freedom and neuroscience: how would Schopenhauer's metaphysics respond to neurological determinism?

Abstract

Experiments carried out by neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet and Michael Gazzaniga suggest the impossibility of having freedom in individual actions. Although those two scientists have developed theories and experiments that are somewhat different from each other, the general result is that the brain decides independently of the agent's consciousness. In this article, we show that such experiments can be qualified as the empirical confirmation of what the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, already in the 19th century, stated based on a priori arguments, based on the principle of sufficient reason. However, Schopenhauer also supported a theory of freedom in the character of the agent, rather than the freedom of actions. We will see that this Schopenhauerian theory of moral freedom was not affected by the works of Libet and Gazzaniga, since, at best, the two scientists would have proven the absence of freedom of singular decisions, leaving untouched the question about the moral constitution of the agent.