The problem of the affection in the post-kantianism and the conception of the empirical intuition in Schopenhauer

Abstract

This article begins presenting in a synthetic way elements of the polemic involving the so-called “problem of affection”, that occurred in the years following the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. To this end, are briefly reconstituted some Jacobi, Reinhold, Schulze and Fichte’s arguments. This reconstitution serves as the basis for the ensuing presentation of how Schopenhauer historically interprets the problem of affection and, in his way, absorbs its demands in important components of his philosophy, seeking to solve it by his conception of the empirical intuition. As a background, the exposure of this movement makes possible to problematize the self-proclaimed Schopenhauer’s total rejection of the post-kantianism philosophy and, conversely, evinces a central element of the schopenhaurian fidelity to the original project of the critical philosophy.