Economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy of the state of Rio Grande do Sul between 1964 and 1998
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/141465093478Keywords:
Deficit per capita, Fiscal delusion, Interest groups, Institutions budgets, CointegrationAbstract
The current literature on the political economy of the public deficit assumes the possibility of that in addition to economic factors, are determinants of the public deficit order factors political and institutional changes such as institutional regime change, electoral legislation and
Budget institutions. The purpose of this article is to verify the applicability of this the case of the state of Rio Grande do Sul in the period between the years of 1964 and 1998 from the use of the intertemporal budget restriction of the government and techniques of the unitary and cointegration root literature, the balance of between the variable expenses and per capita revenue, and the estimated mechanism of correction based on economic, political and institutional factors. It is concluded that the adjustment variable used by the State government is the per capita expenditure, and that the models of interest groups are verified by the present study, as well as the influence of the political system and fiscal institutions.
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