Déficit público, aspectos institucionais e políticos: um modelo normativo

Autores

  • Gilberto de Oliveira Veloso Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, RS, Brasil

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/141465093397

Palavras-chave:

Déficit público, Escolha pública, Interação de grupos

Resumo

A literatura corrente sobre a economia política do déficit público assume a existência de interação entre déficit público e restrições de ordens política e institucional. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir essa relação a partir da construção de um modelo normativo com base em fatos estilizados tomados de evidências empíricas e da literatura corrente. São discutidos os resultados do equilíbrio de Nash na ausência de coordenação da autoridade governamental. Neste ambiente, o produto fiscal é compatível a um jogo não cooperativo mediante o processo de Markov.

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Publicado

2000-06-01

Como Citar

Veloso, G. de O. (2000). Déficit público, aspectos institucionais e políticos: um modelo normativo. Economia E Desenvolvimento, (11), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.5902/141465093397

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