The logical interpretation of Plato's "Parmenides" in the Middle Platonism

Abstract

In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.