Presence, forgiveness, and anger in second-personal morality: a reply to Williges and Vogelmann

Autori

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378694097

Parole chiave:

Second-personal morality, Forgiveness, Anger, Attitudes of the heart, Reciprocity

Abstract

In this article I respond to the criticisms of Flavio Williges and Rafael Vogelmann regarding my book The Heart and its Attitudes. I clarify that the notion of presence and heartfelt second-personal connection should not be confined to agents with deontic competence: we can also be mutually present and emotionally connected with children and animals. I further defend my distinction between deontic and heartfelt forgiveness, maintaining that the absence of affective content in the former does not undermine its second-personal character. Finally, I argue that what I describe as “personal anger”—even if not universally categorized as anger—is a genuine form of emotional appeal for recognition within intimate relationships, and should be understood as belonging to the domain of attitudes of the heart.

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Biografia autore

Stephen Darwall, University of Yale

Professor at University of Yale

Riferimenti bibliografici

Darwall, S. The Heart & its Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191990281.001.0001

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Pubblicato

2025-11-06

Come citare

Darwall, S. (2025). Presence, forgiveness, and anger in second-personal morality: a reply to Williges and Vogelmann. Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy, 16(2), e94097. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378694097

Fascicolo

Sezione

Articles - Dossier Emotions and Affectivity