Trust as a social emotion

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378693794

Keywords:

Trust, Emotion, Society, Cooperation, Reasons for action

Abstract

The development of trusting relations is one of the central aspects of human sociality. Trust makes it possible for people to count on and cooperate with each other, creating the conditions for people to achieve goods and promote their interests and well-being. Yet, justifying trust can be a vexing task. This paper offers a proposal on the nature of trust and its possible justification that aims to combine both cognitive and emotional aspects into a unified account, seeking to reconcile two opposing tendencies in the literature, namely, rationalist and emotional views. Trust should be understood as a normative relation of a special sort and a combination of restricted rationality and emotional “amplification”. More specifically, it involves a complex two-level social emotion that plays a dual role: it partly responds to the truster’s available evidence about the trustworthiness of others, but also goes beyond this evidence by expressing a form of optimism that never eliminates vulnerability and risk. Thus, trust is a kind of practical optimism and openness cultivated within social environments. As such, the only possible justification for trust will be ultimately “subjective”.

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Author Biography

Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro é doutor em Filosofia pela University of Sheffield, Inglaterra (2009); mestre em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (2004); bacharel em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (2004). É professor associado do departamento de filosofia da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Suas áreas de atuação são: meta-ética, ética, psicologia moral, filosofia da ação, teoria das emoções, identidade pessoal, história da filosofia moral britânica e David Hume. 

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Published

2025-11-01

How to Cite

Ribeiro, L. de M. (2025). Trust as a social emotion. Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy, 16(2), e93794. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378693794

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Section

Articles - Dossier Emotions and Affectivity