Why do emotions matter?

Abstract

In this article, I investigate three central approaches to understanding contemporary theories of emotions: William James’s sentimentalism, Robert Solomon’s cognitivism, and Martha Nussbaum’s judicative theory. First, I review James's proposal and Prinz's neo-Jamesianism, which identify emotions as automatic physiological reactions, highlighting its limitations in capturing the evaluative and intentional dimensions of affect. Next, I analyze Solomon’s contribution, which portrays emotions as active modes of interpretation and moral engagement, structured by evaluative judgments that shape our identity. I then emphasize Nussbaum’s theory, whose defining contribution lies in conceiving emotions as embodied judgments—value-laden beliefs that take shape in the body and confer meaning on people, events, or situations. Finally, I argue that, from this cognitivist perspective, emotions cease to be secondary phenomena or biological by-products and instead become evaluative judgments that guide our decisions, reveal our deepest commitments, and underpin the construction of meaning in human life.