Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378643310

Keywords:

Eleatic monism, Numerical pluralism, Attribute pluralism, Forms

Abstract

In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.

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Author Biography

Renato Matoso, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ

Professor of Philosophy at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ

References

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Published

2020-04-15

How to Cite

Matoso, R. (2020). Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides". Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy, 11(1), 52–69. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378643310