Predictive Processing: representation in the eyes of the beholder
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378637881Keywords:
Predictive processing, Representationalist, Embodied cognitionAbstract
Since the 90's, corporeity has been playing an increasingly more central part in the explanations of cognitive sciences. This has brought incisive criticisms (both conceptual and empirical) to the supposition that representations are the mark of the mental. That notwithstanding, cognitive scientists seem unwilling to dispose of the representationalist vocabulary. This article attempts to shed some light on the question whether one of the main paradigms of cognitive sciences, Predictive Processing, is committed to representationalism, thus reviewing some arguments for the non-representationalist interpretation of its tenets and salvaging the insight of embodied views of cognition, according to which the exploratory action of an organism in its environment does not require the generation of representational models about that environment.
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