The complexity of international climate cooperation

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2357797574226

Palabras clave:

International climate cooperation, Game theory, Dilemmas of collective action, Neoclassical rationality, Complex adaptive systems

Resumen

Although there are several collective efforts to address the problem of climate change, the main initiatives, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, have not shown satisfactory results so far. The difficulty in engaging states into effective coordinated cooperative practices can be explained as a consequence of neoclassical rationality, given that the characterization of states as rationality-endowed entities bound them to situations like the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game and its related collective action dilemmas. There are models that provide ways to circumvent PD and foster cooperation among selfish rational agents, such as the application of strategies based on reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) in iterated games. However, these approaches do not avoid the short-sighted neoclassical rationality that lies at the root of the problem. Thus, in order to develop more productive approaches to the development of global climate change policies, I present a characterization of the international political system as a complex adaptive system (CAS) and argue that this perspective, along with models based on evolutionary games rather than iterated games, provide a more promising approach.

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Biografía del autor/a

Claudio Andrés Téllez Zepeda, Universidade Brasil

Bacharel em Matemática com ênfase em Matemática Aplicada (PUC-Rio), Bacharel em Relações Internacionais (Centro Universitário da Cidade), MBA em Gestão de Comércio Exterior e Negócios Internacionais (FGV/RJ), Mestre em Relações Internacionais (PUC-Rio) e Doutor em Relações Internacionais (PUC-Rio). Trabalhou como docente nos cursos de graduação em Relações Internacionais da PUC-Rio e da Universidade Anhembi Morumbi (SP), no curso de pós-graduação em Comércio Exterior da Universidade Católica de Petrópolis e no MBA em Gestão de Pessoas da Universidade Estácio de Sá. Em Teoria Política, utiliza Teoria Evolutiva dos Jogos para o estudo da origem e evolução de instituições sociais e políticas fundamentais. Atualmente, cursa o mestrado em Engenharia Biomédica na Universidade Brasil (SP) e suas pesquisas se concentram nas aplicações da espectroscopia vibracional (Infravermelho e Raman) e eletrônica (UV-Vis) no estudo de moléculas biorrelevantes para o desenvolvimento de fármacos e das bases moleculares de condições patológicas.

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Publicado

2023-03-15

Cómo citar

Zepeda, C. A. T. (2023). The complexity of international climate cooperation. Revista InterAção, 14(1), e74226. https://doi.org/10.5902/2357797574226