On the logic of Schopenhauerian pessimism: a layout of his argumentative plan and directions for a critical analysis

Résumé

Arthur Schopenhauer is predominantly considered a kind of arch-pessimist and founder of the movement classified as "modern philosophical pessimism," due to his innovative claim to maintain, in a systematic way and on “objective reasons”, that non-being is better than being. However, two other groups of scholars follow different directions. One of them does not deny Schopenhauer's pessimism but attributes it especially to subjective reasons, such as his melancholic behavior. The other group does not even consider Schopenhauer as a pessimist, but, on the contrary, as an optimist, an indication that we lack clear and explicit criteria for understanding what Schopenhauerian pessimism would be. I argue that there is, indeed, a pessimistic "logic" objectively articulated within Schopenhauer's philosophy, and that therefore we must examine Schopenhauerian pessimism according to the philosophical reasons that make up his argumentative plan. To support this hypothesis, my first objective is to outline such a plan, following an informal model of the argumentative analysis. This approach also guides a more reflective critical assessment of his pessimistic "logic". Thus, the second objective is to introduce some parameters for further evaluation of the argumentative reach of Schopenhauerian pessimism.