Heranças fichteanas no pensamento de Schopenhauer
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378696546Keywords:
Schopenhauer, Fichte, Transcendental philosophyAbstract
The paper investigates the relationship between Schopenhauer’s thought and Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, showing that this relationship cannot be reduced to a simple opposition (§1). Based on Schopenhauer’s notes on Fichte’s lectures and on his major works (On the Fourfold Root, The World as Will and Representation), it argues that the philosopher from Frankfurt independently develops some fundamental intuitions of the Wissenschaftslehre. In this context, the paper proposes to reinterpret the positions of Fichte and Schopenhauer not as expressions of a struggle for the affirmation of the subject, but rather as expressions of an effort to gain access to reality beyond its discursive mediations (§2). The analysis highlights, in particular, three elements of continuity between Fichte and Schopenhauer: the epistemological grounding of the ontological dimension (§3), the intellectual character of intuition (§4), and the de-potentiation of the subject (§5). These aspects make it possible to understand transcendentalism as a thinking of limits and of the subject’s exposure to an originary alterity. Finally, the paper suggests that this convergence opens the way to a phenomenological reading of consciousness, in which meaning is rooted in a pre-reflective and passive dimension, thereby anticipating later developments in contemporary philosophy (§6).
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