Beyond the distributive-alocative image: A relational interpretation of John Rawls’ theorie of justice

Abstract

This article challenges a certain understanding of Rawlsian theory of justice that regards it as a distributive-allocative paradigm focused on the “distribution of goods” for people understood as “recipients of goods”, as Iris Young contends in her magnum opus. Given the influence of Young’s objection on debates in theories of justice, the first section reconstructs her critique of the distributive-allocative paradigm on Rawls’ works. In the second section, based on Elisabeth Anderson’s benchmark article, it is argued in which way Young's original intuition is correct in diagnosing the misadventures of the distributive debates of that time, when the meaning of the Rawlsian “social egalitarianism” was disputed. In accordance with the diagnosis described by the authors, Rainer Forst summarises his insights into the famous distinction between the two “pictures of justice”: distributive-allocative and relational. Although Forst agrees that in the contemporary scenario a picture of justice – and Rawlsian egalitarianism – competes as a distributive-allocative theory strictly focused on resources and goods, he argues that Rawlsian justice best fits the relational picture. To show its relational aspects, in the fourth section, three fundamental ideas of “justice as fairness” – society, person and well-ordered society – are reconstructed