Teorias sobre o lembrar: causalismo, simulacionismo e funcionalismo
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https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378640445Palavras-chave:
Lembrar, Memória, Causalismo, Simulacionismo, FuncionalismoResumo
O que é o lembrar? Quando podemos dizer que um sujeito lembra um evento do passado? Essas são duas questões centrais na filosofia da memória, uma área que vem experimentando uma rápida expansão nos últimos anos. Por quase meio século, a teoria causal da memória, inicialmente proposta por Martin e Deutscher (1966), dominou o debate sobre como devemos responder às duas questões iniciais. Mais recentemente, no entanto, a teoria causal se tornou alvo de duras críticas, o que motivou os filósofos da memória a desenvolverem duas novas teorias sobre o lembrar: a teoria simulacionista e a teoria funcionalista. Neste artigo, exploramos essas teorias em mais detalhes com o objetivo de tornar mais claro quais são seus comprometimentos, assim como suas vantagens e desvantagens.
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