Social norms, endogenous tastes and governmental action

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/1414650969445

Keywords:

Economic analysis of law, Social norms, Endogenous preferences, Government

Abstract

The article proposes to revisit the literature on social norms and Law and Economics and offer a methodological distinction of the different ways in which social norms are approached in this literature. Furthermore, it discusses how differences in the conceptions of social norms, especially those that treat social norms as capable of altering individual preferences, affect the way in which government should act.

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Author Biography

Felipe Coelho Sigrist, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Doutorando e Mestre em Economia pelo PPGEco/UFSC. Graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Tem dedicado sua pesquisa aos seguintes tópicos: Direito e Economia; Teoria Econômica do Crime; Metodologia em Economia e História do Pensamento Econômico Moderno. Membro do Grupo de Estudos de Teoria Econômica do Crime (GETEC/UFSC). 

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Published

2023-04-11

How to Cite

Sigrist, F. C. (2023). Social norms, endogenous tastes and governmental action. Economia E Desenvolvimento, 34, e1. https://doi.org/10.5902/1414650969445

Issue

Section

Estado, Mercado e as suas interações no Desenvolvimento