Social norms, endogenous tastes and governmental action
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/1414650969445Keywords:
Economic analysis of law, Social norms, Endogenous preferences, GovernmentAbstract
The article proposes to revisit the literature on social norms and Law and Economics and offer a methodological distinction of the different ways in which social norms are approached in this literature. Furthermore, it discusses how differences in the conceptions of social norms, especially those that treat social norms as capable of altering individual preferences, affect the way in which government should act.
Downloads
References
AKERLOF, G. A.; KRANTON, R. E. Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 115, no 3, p. 715-753, 2000.
BECKER, G. S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, v. 76, no 2, p. 169-217, 1968.
BOWLES, S. Endogenous Preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, JSTOR, v. 36, no 1, p. 75-111, 1998.
BRITES, M.; ALMEIDA, F.; MARIN, S. R. Economia e Identidade no Século XXI: as contribuições de Akerlof e Kraton, Sen e Davis. Análise Econômica, v. 37, no 74, p. 203-225, 2019.
CASTRO, A. S. R. Ensaios sobre Preferências. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, p. 1-127, 2019.
COOTER, R. Expressive Law and Economics. The Journal of Legal Studies, v. 27, no 2, p. 585-607, 1998.
COOTER, R. Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An economic analysis of internalized norms. Virginia Law Review, v. 86, no 8, p. 1577-1601, 2000a.
COOTER, R. Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: expression, deterrence, and internalization. Oregon Law Review, v. 79, p. 1-12, 2000b.
DAVIS, J. B. Identity and Individual Economic Agents: a narrative approach. Review of Social Economy, v. 67, no 1, p. 71-94, 2009.
DEQUECH, D. Institutions, Social Norms, and Decision-Theoretic Norms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, v. 72, no 1, p. 70-78, 2009.
ELLICKSON, R. The Market for Social Norms. American Law and Economics Review, v. 3, no 1, p. 1-49, 2001.
ELSTER, J. Social Norms and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 3, no 4, p. 99-117, 1989.
ETZIONI, A. Social Norms: Internalization, persuasion, and history. Law and Society Review, JSTOR, v. 34, no 1, p. 157-178, 2000.
FREY, B. S. Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar Publishing, 1997.
FUNK, P. Governmental Action, Social Norms, and Criminal Behavior. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, JSTOR, v. 161, no 3, p. 522-535, 2005.
HAUSMAN, D.; MCPHERSON, M. Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics. Economics & Philosophy, v. 25, no 1, p. 1-25, 2009.
KAHAN, D. Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence. Virginia Law Review, HeinOnline, v. 83, no 2, p. 349-395, 1997.
KAHAN, D. Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime. The Journal of Legal Studies, v. 27, no 2, p. 609-622, 1998.
LAZZARINI, S.; MILLER, G.; ZENGER, T. Order with some Law: Complementarity versus substitution of formal and informal arrangements. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, v. 20, no 2, p. 261-298, p. 2004.
LESSIG, L. Social Meaning and Social Norms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 144, p. 2181-2189, 1996.
LICHT, A. Social Normas and the Law: Why people obey the law? Review of Law & Economics, v. 4, no 3, p. 715-750, 2008.
MCADAMS, R.; RASMUSEN, E. Norms in Law and Economics. Kelley School of Business Working Paper, p. 1-49, 2004.
MCCLOSKEY, H. A non-utilitarian approach to punishment. Inquiry, v. 8, p. 249-263, 1965.
POSNER, E. Standards, Rules, and Social Norms. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, HeinOnline, v. 21, p. 101-117, 1997a.
POSNER, R. Social Norms and the Law: An economic approach. The American Economic Review, JSTOR, v. 87, no 2, p. 365-369, 1997b.
RACHLINSKI, J. J. The Limits of Social Norms. Chicago-Kent Law Review, HeinOnline, v. 74, p. 1537-1567, 1998.
RASMUSEN, E.; POSNER, R. Creating and Enforcing Norms, with special reference to sanctions. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper, no 96, Law School, University of Chicago, p. 369-382, 2000.
SAMUELSON, P. A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior. Economica, JSTOR, v. 5, no 17. p. 61-71, 1938.
SATZ, D.; FEREJOHN, J. Rational Choice and Social Theory. The Journal of Philosophy, JSTOR, v. 91, no 2, 71-87, 1994.
SEN, A. Economic Methodology: Heterogeneity and Relevance. Social Research, v.71, no 3, p. 583-614, 2004.
SEN, A. Identity and Violence: The illusion of Destiny. London, Editora: Penguin, 2006.
STIGLER, G.; BECKER, G. De Gustibus non est Disputandum. The American Economic Review, JSTOR, v. 67, no 2, p. 76-90, 1977.
STROTZ, R. H. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. The Review of Economic Studies, JSTOR, v. 23, no 3, p. 165-180, 1955.
SUNSTEIN, C. R. Social Norms and Social Roles. Columbia Law Review, HeinOnline, v. 96, p. 903-968, 1996.
WEISBROD, B. A. Comparing Utility Function in Efficiency Terms, or what kind of utility function do we want? The American Economic Review, JSTOR, v. 67, no 5, p. 991-995, 1977.
YAARI, M. Endogenous Changes in Tastes: A philosiphical discussion. Erkenntnis, v. 11, no 2, p. 157-196, 1975.
ZASU, Y. Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or complements? The Journal of Legal Studies, v. 36, no 2, p. 379-396, 2007.
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Economia e Desenvolvimento
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The journal reserves the right of making changes in the originals in a normative order, orthographic and grammatical, with the objective of maintaining the language cult pattern, respecting the authors success. The final tests will not be sent to the authors. The published papers become the Economics and Development propriety. The opinions issued by the article’s authors are their own responsibility.
