Normas sociais, preferências endógenas e ação governamental

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/1414650969445

Palavras-chave:

Análise Econômica do Direito, Normas Sociais, Preferências Endógenas, Governo

Resumo

O artigo tem como proposta revisitar a literatura de normas sociais e Law and Economics e oferecer uma distinção metodológica das diferentes formas pelas quais as normas sociais são abordadas nesta literatura. Ademais, discute-se como as diferenças nas concepções de normas sociais, principalmente aquelas que tratam as normas sociais como capazes de alterar as preferências individuais, afetam a forma pela qual o governo deve atuar.

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Biografia do Autor

Felipe Coelho Sigrist, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Doutorando e Mestre em Economia pelo PPGEco/UFSC. Graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Tem dedicado sua pesquisa aos seguintes tópicos: Direito e Economia; Teoria Econômica do Crime; Metodologia em Economia e História do Pensamento Econômico Moderno. Membro do Grupo de Estudos de Teoria Econômica do Crime (GETEC/UFSC). 

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Publicado

2023-04-11

Como Citar

Sigrist, F. C. (2023). Normas sociais, preferências endógenas e ação governamental. Economia E Desenvolvimento, 34, e1. https://doi.org/10.5902/1414650969445

Edição

v. 34 (2022)

Seção

Estado, Mercado e as suas interações no Desenvolvimento

Licença

Copyright (c) 2023 Economia e Desenvolvimento

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