Aspects of legal theories in Kant and Schopenhauer

Abstract

The article aims to compare the theories of right of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, with an emphasis on the concepts of right and morality. Despite their profound philosophical differences, both theories have structural points of convergence, particularly in the way they conceive of law as a necessary tool for regulating human behavior and guaranteeing social coexistence. The analysis starts from Schopenhauer's critique of Kantian doctrine, especially those formulated in On the Foundations of Morals, The World as Will and Representation, and the appendix of criticism on Kant's philosophy, questioning the strict separation between ethics and law proposed by Kant and exploring how the two philosophers treat key concepts such as duty, coercion, and the neminem laede principle. With this, it is hoped to show that, although Kant's and Schopenhauer's approaches are methodologically distinct - with Kant basing himself on rational principles and Schopenhauer on an empirical metaphysics - their philosophy of right proves to be the expression of a very similar conception of the human being, and both recognize the need for a legal system that deals with human selfishness and ensures freedom within an organized society.