Rationalism in International Relations: Concepts, Theoretical Limits and Criticism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2357797533219Palavras-chave:
Rationalism, rational choice, Models of Foreign Policy Analysis, Two-Level Games, Nested Games.Resumo
The present paper analyzes the presence of the axiom of the rationality of the political actors in theories of International Relations and traces considerations about the concept of rationality as a whole, its theoretical limits and the main criticisms about it. Aiming to overcome the absence of an in-depth conceptualization for the idea of rationality, the paper base itself on the literature of rational choice theory of Political Science to define the concept in question. It questions the validity of considering the states as rational actors and the limits of explanation offered by the axiom of rationality, addressing the criticisms originated from the constructivist current of International Relations. It concludes that considering states as rational actors is a valid theoretical simplification in cases where subnational actors with decision-making power behave as a cohesive unit and argues that rationalist theories and approaches such as constructivism are potentially reconcilable, considering that they are two analytical lenses whose nature is more complementary than contradictory.
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