A reflection on the temporality in Plato’s “Parmenides”

Abstract

The passage 140e-141d of the Parmenides dialogue refers us to one of the logical consequences in relation to the “one”, that is, to be out of time, as part of the argumentative demonstration of the Eleatic philosopher by admitting the first hypothesis that “the one is” and the consequences of this to the one itself. Accepting the existence of the one implies, according to the method of analysis used by Parmenides, to check each of the possible hypotheses in these cases, in relation to their predications, for themselves and other things. Equally, the same exercise should be done if the hypothesis is the opposite, “if the one is not.” As we can identify in the structure of the dialogue in this part, two hypotheses are raised in which “the one is” and nine consequences thereof arise; in the first movement (137c-142a), the possible predications for this one are denied, and in the second movement (142b-155e) such predications and their unfolding are recognized. It is from such placement that we develop our analysis on the issue of temporality addressed in the dialogue and its methodological and theoretical implications.