The epistemology of self-determination in the United Nations and the International Court of Justice

Abstract

The dogma of Self-Determination became an institute of International Law from the UN. Its epistemic development was marked by an intense and wide range of interpretations that denatured its legal nature over time: It was a political principle, it became a principle of International Law, axis of International Human Rights Law, prerogative of law, properly speaking. In this last nature, it became a dogma of erga omnes application, with a clear tendency to manifest itself as a peremptory norm of International Law. This work aims to demonstrate the epistemic path taken by dogma within the UN scope, with preponderance in the jurisprudential analysis of the International Court of Justice. Through the inductive method, using bibliographical and documentary research in addition to case law analysis, the work assumes a critical perspective on the rumors drawn up by international institutions about the dogma. It is an approach of confrontation between the current nature of the dogma and the attitude that it should originally have been.