Entre gastos e autonomia: indústria de defesa e hierarquias regionais no Oriente Médio, 2010-2024
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5902/2357797596239Palavras-chave:
Oriente Médio, Indústria de defesa, Gastos militares, Autonomia industrial-militar, Hierarquias regionaisResumo
Este artigo investiga por que a conversão de recursos econômicos em poder político-militar produz resultados tão distintos no equilíbrio de poder do Oriente Médio entre 2010 e 2024. Ele argumenta que essa hierarquia regional é condicionada pela interação entre duas variáveis independentes — gastos em defesa e autonomia industrial-militar —, cuja combinação define a posição relativa dos Estados no equilíbrio regional. A partir de uma análise qualitativo-comparativa de cinco casos — Israel, Turquia, Arábia Saudita, Emirados Árabes Unidos e Irã —, o estudo propõe uma tipologia de quatro modelos de conversão de recursos em poder militar. Cada um é definido por combinações observáveis das variáveis independentes: primazia militar (Israel), potência industrial ascendente (Turquia), potências dependentes (Arábia Saudita e Emirados) e potência revisionista assimétrica (Irã). Os resultados demonstram que hierarquias regionais são reproduzidas menos por flutuações conjunturais de gasto e mais por estruturas produtivas e tecnológicas de longo prazo, oferecendo um quadro analítico transferível a outras regiões marcadas por dependência de tecnologia e inserção assimétrica nas cadeias globais de defesa.
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