Monetary policy rules and wage bargaining structure in a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with strategic interaction between unions and monetary authority

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2526629285149

Palabras clave:

Monetary policy, Inflation, Unemployment

Resumen

The objective of this article is to present a New Keynesian general equilibrium model in which the multiplicity of wage and price setters in a framework of strategic interaction between the private sector and monetary authority is a sufficient condition for non-neutrality of the monetary policy rule. In this theoretical framework we can show that (i) strategic interaction between monetary authority and labor unions produce the so-called “Calmfors-Driffil effect” in which different levels of centralization in wage bargains allowed to reach different results in terms of equilibrium unemployment rate; (ii) a higher level of conservatism in the conduction of monetary policy; i.e. higher weight for deviations of price inflation from the target in the monetary policy rule, for a given level of centralization of wage bargaining, produce better outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment.  These results shows that there is a trade-off between centralization of wage bargaining and a tighter monetary policy rule: the more centralized is the wage bargaining structure lower can be the weight of inflation in the monetary policy rule that allowed Central Bank could be to achieve some target level of inflation and unemployment. So, the model proposed here shows that income policies can be, in principle, such effective as monetary policy as a device for improve macroeconomic performance of capitalist economies.

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Biografía del autor/a

José Luis da Costa Oreiro, University of Brasília

Doctor en Economía en 2000 por el Instituto de Economía de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro. Profesor Asociado, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Brasilia. Profesor del Programa de Doctorado en Integración Económica de la Universidad del País Vasco (Bilbao/España). Investigadora Nivel I del CNPq. Coordinadora del Área de Investigación Macroeconomía del Desarrollo: perspectivas desde el Sur global. Miembro Senior de la Sociedad de Economía Postkeynesiana y Coordinador del grupo de investigación Macroeconomía Estructuralista del Desarrollo, inscrito en el directorio de grupos de investigación del CNPq. Ha publicado más de 140 artículos en revistas científicas de Brasil y del exterior. Es autor de los libros "Macroeconomía del Desarrollo: Una Perspectiva Keynesiana" (GEN, 2016) y "Macrodinámica Post-Keynesiana: Crecimiento y Distribución del Ingreso" (Alta Books, 2018). Ganó el Premio Brasil de Economía en la Categoría Libro (2017 y 2021).

Flávio Augusto Corrêa Basílio, Banco do Brasil,

Flávio Basilio es un economista con experiencia en finanzas, gobernanza, gestión de riesgos, cumplimiento y liderazgo. Tiene una Maestría y un Doctorado en economía y ha ocupado cargos significativos en el Banco do Brasil.

Basilio también ha desempeñado varios cargos de alto nivel en el gobierno federal, incluyendo secretario de Seguridad Nacional, secretario de Productos de Defensa y Subsecretario de Asuntos Internacionales del Ministerio de Planificación. Ha sido miembro de diversos comités, incluyendo los Comités de Comercio Exterior y Financiamiento Internacional (GECEX y COFIG), el Consejo Nacional de Metrología, Normalización y Calidad Industrial (CONMETRO), y el Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico (FNDCT).

Basilio también es un destacado académico, enseñando economía, macroeconomía y economía brasileña en la Universidad de Brasilia, así como estadísticas, finanzas, gestión financiera, finanzas corporativas y análisis de escenarios económicos en UDF, FGV y la Universidad Mackenzie.

Citas

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Publicado

2023-12-12

Cómo citar

Oreiro, J. L. da C., & Basílio, F. A. C. (2023). Monetary policy rules and wage bargaining structure in a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with strategic interaction between unions and monetary authority. Práticas De Administração Pública, 6(2), 91–129. https://doi.org/10.5902/2526629285149

Número

Vol. 6 Núm. 2 (2022): Práticas de Administração Pública

Sección

Artigos

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