Monetary policy rules and wage bargaining structure in a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with strategic interaction between unions and monetary authority

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5902/2526629285149

Palavras-chave:

Monetary policy, Inflation, Unemployment

Resumo

The objective of this article is to present a New Keynesian general equilibrium model in which the multiplicity of wage and price setters in a framework of strategic interaction between the private sector and monetary authority is a sufficient condition for non-neutrality of the monetary policy rule. In this theoretical framework we can show that (i) strategic interaction between monetary authority and labor unions produce the so-called “Calmfors-Driffil effect” in which different levels of centralization in wage bargains allowed to reach different results in terms of equilibrium unemployment rate; (ii) a higher level of conservatism in the conduction of monetary policy; i.e. higher weight for deviations of price inflation from the target in the monetary policy rule, for a given level of centralization of wage bargaining, produce better outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment.  These results shows that there is a trade-off between centralization of wage bargaining and a tighter monetary policy rule: the more centralized is the wage bargaining structure lower can be the weight of inflation in the monetary policy rule that allowed Central Bank could be to achieve some target level of inflation and unemployment. So, the model proposed here shows that income policies can be, in principle, such effective as monetary policy as a device for improve macroeconomic performance of capitalist economies.

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Biografia do Autor

José Luis da Costa Oreiro, Universidade de Brasília

Doutor em Economia em 2000 pelo Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Professor Associado do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasília. Professor do Programa de Doutorado em Integração Econômica da Universidade do País Basco (Bilbao/Espanha). Pesquisador Nível I do CNPq. Coordenador da Área de Pesquisa Developmental Macroeconomics: perspectives from the global South. Membro Senior da Post Keynesian Economics Soiciety e Coordenador do grupo de pesquisa Macroeconomia Estruturalista do Desenvolvimento cadastrado no diretório dos grupos de pesquisa do CNPq. Publicou mais de 140 artigos em revistas científicas no Brasil e no exterior. É autor dos livros “Macroeconomia do Desenvolvimento: uma perspectiva Keynesiana” (GEN, 2016) e “Macrodinâmica Pós-Keynesiana: crescimento e distribuição de renda” (Alta Books, 2018). Ganhou o Prêmio Brasil de Economia na Categoria Livro (2017 e 2021).

Flávio Augusto Corrêa Basílio, Banco do Brasil

Flávio Basilio é economista com experiência em finanças, governança, gestão de riscos, compliance e liderança. É mestre e doutor em economia e ocupou posições significativas no Banco do Brasil. Basílio também atuou em vários cargos de alto nível no governo federal, incluindo Secretário de Segurança Interna, Secretário de Produtos de Defesa e Secretário Adjunto de Assuntos Internacionais do Ministério do Planejamento. Foi membro de diversos comitês, incluindo os Comitês de Comércio Exterior e de Financiamento Internacional (GECEX e COFIG), o Conselho Nacional de Metrologia, Normalização e Qualidade Industrial (CONMETRO) e o Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT). Basílio também é acadêmico, lecionando economia, macroeconomia e economia brasileira na Universidade de Brasília, além de lecionar estatística, finanças, gestão financeira, finanças corporativas e análise de cenários econômicos na UDF, FGV e Universidade Mackenzie.

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Publicado

2023-12-12

Como Citar

Oreiro, J. L. da C., & Basílio, F. A. C. (2023). Monetary policy rules and wage bargaining structure in a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with strategic interaction between unions and monetary authority. Práticas De Administração Pública, 6(2), 91–129. https://doi.org/10.5902/2526629285149

Edição

v. 6 n. 2 (2022): Práticas de Administração Pública

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Artigos

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