The two souls of Schopenhauerism: analysis of new historiographical categories

Le due anime dello schopenhauerismo: analisi delle nuove categorie storiografiche

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Abstract: The Wirkungsgeschichte of Schopenhauerism is a complex mixture of events, encounters, influences and transformations. In order to orient oneself concerning such an articulated phenomenon, it is necessary to have valid hermeneutical tools at hand. In this contribution, I propose a reading of the Wirkungsgeschichte of Schopenhauerism through new and effective historiographical categories that resulted from the research conducted by the Interdepartmental Research Centre on Arthur Schopenhauer and his School at the University of Salento. On the one hand, I will refer to Domenico Fazio’s studies on the Schopenhauer-Schule and, on the other, to Fabio Ciracì’s research on the reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Italy. This approach will reveal how the formulation of the so-called “two souls” of Schopenhauerism, the romantic and the illuministic, allows us to unravel the multifaceted panorama of the Wirkungsgeschichte of Schopenhauerian philosophy, in line with the subdivision within the Schopenhauer-Schule of metaphysical and heretical thinkers.

Keyword: Schopenhauer; Wirkungsgeschichte; Illuministic soul; Romantic soul; Historiographical categories.

Abstract: La Wirkungsgeschichte dello schopenhauerismo si presenta come una complessa costellazione di eventi, incontri, influenze e trasformazioni. Per orientarsi in un fenomeno così articolato è necessario disporre di validi strumenti ermeneutici. Con il presente contributo si propone una lettura della storia degli effetti dello schopenhauerismo attraverso nuove ed efficaci categorie storiografiche emerse dalle ricerche condotte dal Centro interdipartimentale di ricerca su Arthur Schopenhauer e la sua scuola dell’Università del Salento. In particolare, il riferimento è, da un lato, agli studi di Domenico Fazio sulla Schopenhauer-Schule e, dall’altro, alle ricerche di Fabio Ciracì sulla ricezione della filosofia schopenhaueriana in Italia. Si mostrerà come la formulazione delle cosiddette “due anime” dello schopenhauerismo, una romantica e una illuministica, consente di districarsi nel variegato panorama della storia degli effetti della filosofia schopenhaueriana, in continuità con la suddivisione all’interno della Scuola di Schopenhauer tra pensatori metafisici ed eretici.

Keyword: Schopenhauer; Wirkungsgeschichte; Anima illuministica; Anima romantica; Categorie storiografiche.

New research contributions to Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy

Recent studies on the reception of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, besides being valuable contributions on the historical-philosophical level, provide us with new historiographical categories through which we may read and interpret the ideas of thinkers who, in many different ways, have independently developed Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This research is conducted by the Interdepartmental Research Centre on Arthur Schopenhauer and his School at the University of Salento (Lecce, Italy) by Domenico M.
Fazio and Fabio Ciraci. In the present paper, I will, on the one hand, refer to the studies on the so-called Schopenhauer-Schule im weiteren Sinne; on the other hand, I will examine the organic and systematic study on the first reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the Italian culture. By demonstrating that a Schopenhauer-Schule existed, such research offers relevant information about its components. By components “not only the actual disciples of the wiseman of Frankfurt, but also a large group of thinkers and intellectuals, who have been inspired in various ways by Schopenhauer, proclaiming themselves or having been defined as Schopenhauerians” are meant. On the basis of this definition – which is currently shared by scholars of Schopenhauer’s philosophy –, a further distinction within the school is recognizable. Following Schopenhauer’s statement, Fazio identifies, first of all, a Schopenhauer-Schule im engeren Sinne, that is,

the one that Schopenhauer himself considered his school and which consists of those who had direct relationships, in the form of discipleship and collaborations, with him,

and a Schopenhauer-Schule im weiteren Sinne,

which began to develop after the Master’s death and which includes personalities who were inspired by Schopenhauer in various ways: those who built new metaphysics based on the foundations of Schopenhauer’s doctrine, those who developed particular aspects of his thought in original ways, those who worked in the field of research on Schopenhauer’s thought, spreading and defending its principles; in short, all those who called themselves Schopenhauerians or were called Schopenhauerians.

Moreover, Schopenhauer’s school in the strict sense was made up of apostles and evangelists, that is, Schopenhauer’s followers who did not write about him and those who did, respectively. Concerning the school in the broad sense, however, Fazio distinguishes between metaphysical thinkers and heretics. In the present paper, the focus is on the latter. Metaphysicians are those who, starting from the metaphysics of the will, propose a new reading of it; often reaching worldviews that are distant and independent from the common Schopenhauerian root. This, for instance, holds true for Julius Bahnsen, Eduard von Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer. According to Fazio, heretics, on the contrary, have developed aspects mainly related to Schopenhauer’s ethical doctrine in an autonomous and original way. The positions of these thinkers may not entirely be traced back to Schopenhauer’s philosophy without limiting the importance that each of them has in the history of ideas. By defining them as heretics of Schopenhauer’s thought, Fazio at once grasps the complexity and critical issues of each thinker to whom he refers, as well as the

3 Fazio, D. La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti, cit., p. 14. Cf. Ciraci, F; Fazio, D. M.; Kößler, M. (Hrsg.). Schopenhauer und die Schopenhauer-Schule. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009. All translations from Italian works that are not available in English are mine. This particularly holds true for the works of Fazio and Ciraci, to which I often refer in the present paper.
4 Id., p. 15.
5 Id., pp. 15-16.
subtle but substantial line of continuity with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In particular, Fazio takes into account the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Georg Simmel and Max Horkheimer.

Ciraci’s research on the first reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Italian culture follows the same path as Fazio’s considerations on the developments of the Schopenhauerian philosophy within the Schopenhauer-Schule. He provides the very first systematic study of the development of Schopenhauerism in Italy in the years between 1858 and 1914. Besides disproving the well-established prejudice, which led to the complete absence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Italy⁶, Ciraci offers new historiographical categories, thus facilitating an orientation in the manifold sphere of influence of Schopenhauerism in the Italian culture. Ciraci believes that it is possible to tell the story of the influence and reception of Schopenhauer’s thought by means of what he calls the “two souls” of Schopenhauerism, an illuministic soul and a romantic soul. According to Ciraci, illuministic is Schopenhauer’s reading

of Kantian inspiration, more oriented towards the theory of knowledge and Schopenhauer’s moral issues, who looks at the philosopher of the World as a critic of customs, a philosopher of disenchantment and disillusionment;

Romantic, instead, is the soul

in which the esoteric-spiritualist suggestions of Schopenhauerism are expressed, constantly referring to Buddhism and to the primacy of music. [...] The interpretation of Schopenhauer as irrationalist and vitalist must also be considered romantic, and it is different from religious interpretations of Schopenhauer⁷.

Far from understating such a complex phenomenon as Schopenhauerism in the Italian and, more generally, in the European culture in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century, Ciraci critically examines, on the one hand, the boundary between the two trends and, on the other hand, the outline of a convergence, sometimes subtle, often sharp, between the illuministic and the romantic soul.

Thus, Ciraci examines thinkers with an illuministic soul, like Giacomo Barzellotti, Ettore Zoccoli, Giovanni Papini, Giovanni Vailati and Giuseppe Melli, and thinkers with a romantic soul, like Angelo Conti, Angelo De Gubernatis, Oscar Chilesotti, Alessandro Costa, Giuseppe De Lorenzo, Giovanni Amendola and Eva Kühn.

In addition, by tracing the different phases of the reception of Schopenhauerism between 1858 and 1914, Ciraci observes a different nature in each of them. It emerges not only a general evolution over time from one group of thinkers to another, but also an internal development in the thought of every single scholar of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, due to a common feeling or, more properly, a common reaction to alternative and contrasting worldviews. In fact, in the early years of the twentieth century, a transformation

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⁶ Cf. CIRACÌ, F. La filosofia italiana di fronte a Schopenhauer. La prima ricezione 1858-1914, cit., p. 11 e ff.: Ciraci refers to VECCHIOTTI, L. Schopenhauer nella filosofia italiana e nella “cultura” italiana. In Id., Arthur Schopenhauer. Storia di una filosofia e della sua “fortuna”, Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1976, V, pp. 89-107: 89. Vecchiotti writes: «A research of Schopenhauer’s influence on the Italian culture has a very labile content, because, although elsewhere Schopenhauer was well received […], in Italy he even found himself in a dreary situation, perhaps unique with regard to countries that are proud to have a certain culture. Even today, one often finds an intellectual, a historian and an essayist who is ready to make judgements about him [Schopenhauer], without having ever read or smelled it. Rather than Schopenhauer in Italian culture one should speak of Schopenhauer in Italian cultural misery».

⁷ CIRACÌ, F. La filosofia italiana di fronte a Schopenhauer. La prima ricezione 1858-1914, cit., p. 18.
of the two souls of Schopenhauerism is detectable, which - as Ciraci claims - led to a kind of convergence of these in the view of intellectuals like Piero Martinetti. There is also a number of thinkers who, over time, have undergone a change of course in reference to their starting positions. Also, the mixture of heterogeneous elements allowed some to abandon fixed categories, thus overcoming a unilateral thinking and, so to speak, uniting the two souls of Schopenhauerism, that is, the illuministic and the romantic, again. This holds true for Giovanni Amendola, Giuseppe Melli, to some extent Alessandro Costa, but also irregular Schopenhauerians such as Giuseppe Rensi and Carlo Michelstaedter. With regard to these two irregular thinkers, Ciraci writes

If we wanted to expand the systematic classification for the identification of a Schopenhauer-Schule to two irregular thinkers such as Giuseppe Rensi and Carlo Michelstaedter, as has been proposed by Domenico Fazio, the skeptical notion of Rensi’s philosophical vision would place him immediately among the heretics of the Italian Schopenhauerian school, while Michelstaedter would be, with Martinetti, among the so-called metaphysical thinkers, but only if we consider him a metaphysician of negative thought. Both Rensi and Michelstaedter admire Schopenhauer and are known as Schopenhauerians. Both also represent specific cases of Schopenhauerism, because they have to be placed in the post-Nietzschean context of the philosophies of crisis, that is, of overcoming classical and systematic metaphysics, which are based on absolute principles. Therefore, Rensi and Michelstaedter more properly have to be considered two irregular Schopenhauerian followers, asymptotic thinkers compared to dominant movements and currents of thought. They escape categorizations because of the personal dimension of their thought, as in the case of Rensi, or they are real mavericks with regard to their thought, as in the case of Michelstaedter, but certainly not simple epigones or minor thinkers, as has been written superficially.

The thesis I would like to support is that Fazio’s suggestion to deal with the Schopenhauer-Schule in a broad sense, that is, to divide Schopenhauerian thinkers into metaphysicians and heretics, interacts with and is complemented by the historiographical categories proposed by Ciraci, that is, with the tendency to interpret the followers of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in an illuministic or romantic way. This will become clearer in the ensuing analysis.

The purpose of this essay is not to systematically analyze each thinker who has been inspired by Schopenhauer’s philosophy in various ways: for an in-depth study of this kind, I refer directly to the organic and accurate work of Domenico M. Fazio, La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti, as well as that by Fabio Ciraci, La filosofia italiana di fronte a Schopenhauer, which constitute the essential sources of my contribution. I will rather take a look at the general panorama of Schopenhauerism. Hence, I will consider the Wirkungsgeschichte of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, in the light of the new historiographical categories that I have just introduced. In this way, the complex phenomenon of Schopenhauerism is made more accessible through new and more effective lines of research.

The following analysis emphasizes the use of valid and more effective tools to better orient oneself with regard to what Ciraci has recently defined as the Schopenhauer-Impact.

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8 Id., pp. 280-320.
9 With regard to Rensi and Michelstaedter, Ciraci in Italian writes “schopenhaueriani irregolari”. I translated it literally.
10 Id., pp. 389-423.
11 Id., p. 389.
In the opening lecture of the conference *Schopenhauer e o mundo contemporâneo*, which took place in Curitiba (Brazil) from June 24 to 26, 2020, Fabio Ciracì metaphorically described Schopenhauerism as “the effect produced by a meteorite that fell to earth, putting an end to a geological era and starting a new one, establishing new forms of thought and philosophies. The impact of the meteorite “Schopenhauer” changed the geology of the earth and the position of the earth’s axis: the world no longer revolves around divinity, it is no longer guided by any divine intelligence or grace, it is not the result of the cosmos, that is, of order and beauty, but it is born of dark chaos; it rotates on itself, around its own nonsensical void, and its flaming center is a deaf and blind will”. The image proposed here gives an idea of the extent of Schopenhauer’s thought in the history of ideas, whose effect - as Hans Zint would say - is measured not only in-depth in philosophical studies *stricto sensu*, but also in breadth in the history of culture in general.\(^1\)

**The souls of the Schopenhauer-Schule**

*The romantic soul of metaphysical Schopenhauerians*

In the following analysis, I will attempt to correlate the historiographical categories used by Fazio for the *Schopenhauer-Schule im weiteren Sinne* with the even broader categories used by Ciracì for Schopenhauerism - especially with regard to the Italian reception - on the thought of the so-called metaphysical and heretical Schopenhauerian thinkers.

Fazio writes:

> Three main metaphysical developments unfold from Schopenhauer’s philosophy: Julius Bahnsen’s real-dialectic, Eduard von Hartmann’s philosophy of the unconscious and Philipp Mainländer’s philosophy of redemption. These are just as many proposals to change the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s will and his pessimistic conception of the world.\(^2\)

To Bahnsen, the personal knowledge of Arthur Schopenhauer and of his thought was an illumination. Like many other followers, Bahnsen describes his acquaintance with Schopenhauer as a real spiritual conversion.\(^3\) In particular, in the chapter *Die Stunden bei Schopenhauer* in his autobiography *Wie ich wurde was ich ward*, Bahnsen writes that he feels “enraptured with a new existence” for “having seen a genius of thought face to face, but also a character of the purest sublimity”. In short, that encounter was an “epochal event” for Bahnsen, completely transforming his life. However, leaving aside information about Julius Bahnsen’s biography and education,\(^4\) it is necessary to focus on the way he develops Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and the results he achieves. Starting with *Beiträge zur...*
Charakterologie, the first important work published in 1867, and proceeding with Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen, dating back to 1877, up to the Pessimisten-Brevier of 1879 and finally to his main work Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, there is a gradual development of a metaphysics that connects typical Schopenhauerian features with a radical distance from the thought of the philosopher of the World. The idea of Bahnsen is in fact strictly linked to Schopenhauer's metaphysics insofar as he considers the will the deep essence of the world; at the same time, however, Bahnsen distances himself from Schopenhauer in defining the will and its peculiar characteristics. As Fazio explains in his study, according to Bahnsen, the will is in itself contradictory, since it is "voluntas nolens and voluntas volens." In his main work, Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, he writes that the will "wants what it does not want and does not want what it wants." Such a contradiction is not purely logical or ideal, but real, since it belongs to the metaphysical essence of the world, the will. And as such, the contradiction of the will is insurmountable and leaves no room for redemption. Therefore, Bahnsen calls his worldview "real dialectic" or "science of real contradiction." As regards the self-contradiction of Bahnsen's will, Fazio is clear in stating that the will "is the will to life [Wille zum Leben], which does not want life because it is pain; it is the will from life [Wille vom Leben], which is the will of death, which does not want death because it is the will to life." Bahnsen's concept of the will is finally conceived in a pluralistic and realistic way; a completely different genre than that of the will of Schopenhauer, which eternally wants and from which it is possible to redeem oneself.

Even more critical towards Schopenhauer's philosophy than Julius Bahnsen is Eduard von Hartmann, author of the well-known Philosophie des Unbewussten. Hartmann is probably the metaphysical thinker par excellence, both because of the fortune of his philosophical system and due to the way he developed the metaphysics of Schopenhauer's will. Trying to overcome the contradictions of Schopenhauer's philosophy, Hartmann introduces the term "unconscious", that describes "the metaphysical principle able to unify the Schopenhauerian dualism of will and representation in a monistic and spiritualistic conception of reality." Thus, according to Hartmann, the will, far from being - as for Schopenhauer – blind and irrational, produces representations, albeit unconsciously. If it were not so, the will could not even want, since it would have no object and would be devoid of any purpose. The intellect, instead, which is also spiritual in nature, elaborates the conscious representations; in other words, it produces concepts. It is evident that von Hartmann's theory has several implications, starting from the inclusion of the will in a historical and teleological process that Schopenhauer would have never allowed, then reaching a monism that does not take into account the Kantian roots, from which the...
philosopher of the World starts. Finally, radically different from that of Schopenhauer is the foundation of von Hartmann’s pessimism, for which he introduces the so-called “eudemonological balance”, which is about subtracting the amount of pleasure from the amount of pain that afflicts the world. The result is clear: the sum of pain exceeds the sum of pleasure, which demonstrates that the non-being of this world is better than its being, that “this present world is worse than no world”.

In this regard, Lütkehaus describes von Hartmann’s perspective as „ein nicht sein sollendes Nichtnicht-Sein“. Finally, unlike Bahnsen’s pessimism, defined by von Hartmann as “desperate miserabilism”, the pessimism that permeates the Philosophie des Unbewussten provides a form of redemption, although significantly different from the redemption theorized by Schopenhauer. According to Hartmann, redemption is a universal act, the only act able to annihilate the world. There is no room for compassion and individualistic asceticism: the purpose of the world can be fulfilled through a collective and historical effort. These, in short, are the salient points highlighted by Fazio in his study.

The last of the three main metaphysical positions identified by Fazio is Philipp Mainländer’s Die Philosophie der Erlösung. Philipp Batz – Mainländer’s birth name – was not only a brilliant thinker, but also probably the follower of the Schopenhauer-Schule who had the most extraordinary coherence with his own philosophical ideas. In fact, by working on and developing Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, Mainländer based his entire existence on it. This culminated in his last extreme act of suicide in 1876, which he considered one of the means to accelerate the world’s process towards nothingness. What led Mainländer to commit suicide is a real convergent point with Schopenhauer: the principle that non-being is better than being. Even so, the philosophical suicide theorized and put into practice by Mainländer is radically different from the metaphysical doctrine of Schopenhauer, who, according to his philosophy, cannot, in any way, embrace such a form of redemption. Moreover, Mainländer distanced himself from Schopenhauer; first of all, by means of speaking about what he considers to be the four forms of redemption from the being of the world: knowledge, which converts the will to live into the will to die; with the construction of the socialist state, which weakens the will to live by satisfying needs; with chastity, which prevents the perpetuation of the species; and with suicide. Second, Mainländer departs from Schopenhauer even further in placing alongside the immanent will – as Schopenhauer conceived it –, a single transcendent principle, which precedes the world: God. By combining divine transcendence with the idea that not-being is better than being, Mainländer assumes that God, in order to be perfect, could not continue to be; He necessarily had to turn into nothing, into not-being. Therefore, Gott ist gestorben and God’s suicide was the condition for the birth of the world, the necessary step from unity to multiplicity that initiated the life of the world, and “this simple unity has become, is no longer. Having changed its essence, it shattered entirely into the world of multiplicity. God is dead and his death was the life of the world”. In Philipp Mainländer’s metaphysical foundation, the will to live has turned into the will to die. As a result, Mainländer claims that the entire course of the world naturally moves towards nothingness and that

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27 HARTMANN, E. Philosophie des Unbewussten, cit., pp. 642-643.
32 FAZIO, D. La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti, cit., pp. 122-123.
redemption is guaranteed as the final and natural goal of the world’s process. Such a teleological vision, which leads to the reconciliation of pessimism and optimism, brings Mainländer closer to von Hartmann and distances him from Bahnsen, for whom – as already mentioned – there is no possibility of redemption. Finally, what is interesting to remember, in continuity with Bahnsen, is Mainländer’s description of his first encounter with Arthur Schopenhauer’s thought:

In February 1860 came the greatest and most important day of my life. I went into a bookshop and started leafing through some books that had just arrived from Leipzig. I found Schopenhauer’s *The world as will and representation*. But who was Schopenhauer? I had never heard the name. I leafed through the work, read about the denial of the will to live, in the text I found several quotations known to me, which made me dream. I forgot everything that surrounded me and I immersed into reading. Finally, I said: – How much does the book cost? – Six ducats – Here is the money! – I grabbed my treasure and rushed home from that place like a madman, where in a feverish hurry I cut the first volume and began to read it from the beginning. It was already next day when I stopped. I had read the whole night without stopping. – I got up and felt reborn. […] I felt that I would enter into the most intimate relationship with this Schopenhauer, that something of extraordinary significance had happened in my life.

Can a metaphysical theory really, which men have often discovered by pure chance, have such a strong impact on their thoughts and lives? The stories of Bahnsen and Mainländer certainly help to understand its significance, but what should be stressed here is the direction in which the three metaphysical thinkers were heading. Applying the historiographical categories of the two souls of Schopenhauerism to the metaphysicians of the *Schopenhauer-Schule*, it is possible to propose an interpretation of Julius Bahnsen, Eduard von Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer in a romantic perspective, insofar as these intellectuals advanced their own thought by developing a particular aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy: the metaphysics of the will and all that is closely related to it or could in some way refer to it. Consider, for example, the irrationalistic and spiritualistic tendencies.

1.1. The illuministic soul of heretical Schopenhauerians

Despite having the same starting point, the heretics of the *Schopenhauer-Schule* head in different directions than the metaphysicians. Mostly developing the ethical doctrine of Schopenhauer, the thought of the heretics deviates from the Schopenhauerian root and assumes its own form in the historical-philosophical panorama in an illuministic perspective. This holds true, for instance, for Friedrich Nietzsche. He considers himself a Schopenhauerian, but he is also engaged in the search of proselytes. Like Bahnsen and Mainländer, Nietzsche also describes his encounter with the philosophy of Schopenhauer in terms of a spiritual conversion, an event that has profoundly shaped his life.

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does not share Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will; on the contrary, he severely criticizes it, rigorously attacking the core of the theory, namely the identification of the will with the Kantian thing in itself. Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is, for all intents and purposes, a wide-ranging deconstruction that reveals profound flaws in the theory of the philosopher of the World. Then, what - induces Nietzsche to consider himself a follower of Schopenhauer? In his study, Fazio exhorts his readers to find the reason in Nietzsche’s work Schopenhauer als Erzieher36 from 1874 and in his aphorism Zum alten Probleme: «was ist deutsch?»37 in the fifth book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft from 1887. To paraphrase Nietzsche’s words, Fazio writes that he saw in Schopenhauer “a master of the freedom of the spirit”. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer is “an educator just because he is a liberator”38. The freedom to which Nietzsche refers is a freedom that stands out in the inner self, a freedom from the horror and contradictions of the world. However, it is a freedom that does not convey Schopenhauer’s pessimism; on the contrary, it is reactive, with a view to a possible overcoming of the obstacles it faces. In this sense, according to Nietzsche, not the metaphysics of the will, but the ability to elevate the soul is the true value imparted to him by Schopenhauer’s philosophy39. And this notion is linked more closely to the man Schopenhauer than to his system. Therefore, Fazio writes “intellectual honesty, serenity, firmness, freedom of spirit, trust in truth and untimely ideas: these are the lessons Nietzsche gathered from his master Schopenhauer. From the philosopher. Not from his philosophy”40. In short, besides Schopenhauer’s theories on music, employed by Nietzsche in Die Geburt der Tragödie41, the lasting impression that Schopenhauer left on Friedrich Nietzsche lies in his disenchanted view of the world and his ability to face it as it is.

Even closer than Nietzsche to the Schopenhauerian ethical sphere was Paul Rée, a doctor, philanthropist, philosopher and the author of a paper on Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy entitled Psychologische Beobachtungen42. As can be inferred from the title, Rée’s work distances itself from a metaphysical foundation of ethics, focusing exclusively on the analysis and empirical description of moral actions and on real reasons that allow Rée to theorize pessimism. In other words, according to Paul Rée, abstract speculation does not help to understand the nature of man and the causes of his actions; a careful observation allows us to understand that man is evil, that his every action is based on selfishness and that every effort in order to achieve happiness is in vain because happiness in itself is an illusion. As a consequence, the only way to escape life’s disappointments is to reveal the illusions, recognizing their true nature. Even in Paul Rée, the Schopenhauerian disenchantment or disillusionment concerning the world - albeit devoid of any metaphysical meaning - acts as a fil rouge with regard to the entire ethical doctrine. Therefore, in his study, Fazio properly writes that “Psychological Observations is permeated by a lucid and

38 FAZIO, D. La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti, cit., cit., p. 142.
39 Id., 135.
40 Id., 145.
disenchanted pessimism\textsuperscript{43}. If, therefore, morality cannot be taught and actions are the result of the encounter of our innate character with the education we have received and a constellation of motives that cannot be precisely determined, then the real lesson that can be drawn from Paul Réé’s theory is to “learn to enjoy that much or that little that circumstances grant us” and “not to be troubled by either the illusions or the disillusions of life\textsuperscript{44}.”

Schopenhauerian philosophy has not escaped from Georg Simmel’s criticism either. Fazio traces the developments of Simmel’s thought in the light of his encounter with the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Among the many references to Schopenhauer within Simmel’s works, we must first focus on the text entitled \textit{Exkurs über das Problem: wie ist die Gesellschaft möglich?}\textsuperscript{45}, published for the first time in 1894. There, Simmel propounds a thesis with clear Schopenhauerian influence, according to which “society is my representation”. Just as representation exists in and for the relationship between subject and object, society cannot leave aside individuals and the relationships they establish. In other words, society as well as representation do not precede individuals, but they are derived from and based on them. Simmel’s sociological theory is so articulated that it cannot be put in a nutshell. Anyway, what has been said is enough to draw attention to the issue in question, namely how Georg Simmel developed Schopenhauerian philosophy from an ethical-social point of view. Finally, it is necessary to underline the role that Simmel ascribes to Schopenhauer in what has been called the third phase of his thinking\textsuperscript{46}. The reading of Schopenhauer as the philosopher who questions the meaning, the value and the end of life is related to this period. In the volume \textit{Schopenhauer und Nietzsche}\textsuperscript{47} from 1907, Simmel analyzes the different answers given by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche regarding the philosophy of life, both starting from the common loss of an absolute and transcendent value. On the one hand, the Schopenhauerian statement that life in itself has no meaning, purpose or end inevitably leads to resignation and pessimism; on the other hand, the Nietzschean vision of life as having an end in itself leads to an optimism able to find strength and growth in life itself. Therefore, it must be said that in Simmel as well as for the other heretical thinkers previously analyzed - Schopenhauer’s careful observation of reality prevails. In other terms, Simmel focuses on Schopenhauer interpreted as the upstream philosopher who unveils illusions and who is the pioneer of free thought.

Finally, among the heretical thinkers of the \textit{Schopenhauer-Schule}, Fazio includes Max Horkheimer, the founder of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer is familiarized with philosophy thanks to Schopenhauer’s writings, and he makes reference to these throughout his entire philosophical production: from his early writings to the complete development of the Critical Theory. Therefore – as Fazio observes –, there are hints to, mentions of and references to Schopenhauer not only in \textit{Eva}, a novel from 1915, or in the short story \textit{Arbeit} from 1916\textsuperscript{48}, but also in the introductory lecture for the chair of the philosophy of society, held at the University of Frankfurt in 1931, titled \textit{Die gegenwärtige

\textsuperscript{43} FAZIO, D. \textit{La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti}, cit., p. 150.

\textsuperscript{44} Id., p. 155.


Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung\textsuperscript{49} and in the essays written between 1932 and 1941 for the «Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung». And those were the years during which Horkheimer established the Critical Theory in *Dialektik der Aufklärung*\textsuperscript{50} (1944), written together with Adorno, and in the two contributions *Die Aktualität Schopenhauers*\textsuperscript{51} and *Pessimismus heute*\textsuperscript{52} published in 1961 and 1971, respectively. Finally, Horkheimer was a member of the *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* from 1955 on. He also had a portrait of Schopenhauer in his studio, standing next to that of Karl Marx. All this testifies to Horkheimer’s interest in and constant attention to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As the other heretics of the Schule, Max Horkheimer is interested in Schopenhauer’s social and moral criticism. Horkheimer also found a demystifying power in Schopenhauer, the bearer of a philosophy of disenchantment and disillusionment with regard to the world, intrinsically characterized by critical pessimism. Thus, in his study, Fazio writes:

To Horkheimer, the actuality of Schopenhauer consists in the fact that he is the theorist of a lucidly disenchanted worldview, which promises neither otherworldly nor secularized salvation, but it is not therefore philosophically resigned. In fact, his metaphysics of the will recognizes the irrationality of reality as its essential constitutive feature and thus it does not allow any justification of the state of things. His moral doctrine, on the other hand, finds the ultimate meaning of human life in pain and finiteness and it can therefore provide the foundation for an ethics of sociality and solidarity, which, admitting neither rewards nor otherworldly punishment, is characterized by its secularity\textsuperscript{53}.

Trying once again to expand the historiographical categories of the two souls of Schopenhauerism to the philosophers of the *Schopenhauer-Schule*, it is possible to interpret the heretics according to the broader definition of Schopenhauerian thinkers of an illuministic soul, that is, of those who have mainly developed aspects related to the ethical and moral doctrine of Schopenhauer in an original way, and who are the bearers of a pessimistic worldview, resulting from a disenchanted, disillusioned, but not necessarily resigned viewpoint.

**The two souls of Schopenhauerism in the Italian culture**

In order to really understand the so-called two souls of Schopenhauerism, it is necessary to get to the heart of Ciraci’s work, the first organic and systematic study on the reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Italy.

Concerning the period that his research is devoted to, precisely the years 1858 to 1914, Ciraci distinguishes two different phases of the first reception of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the Italian historical, philosophical and, more generally, cultural panorama: the first phase, reaching from the beginning of the 1870s to the early 1900s, and the second phase of the reception, starting in 1903, the year of the rebirth of Neoidealism, and lasting


\textsuperscript{53} FAZIO, D. *La scuola di Schopenhauer. I contesti*, cit., p. 186.
until just before the First World War. The timeline proposed by Ciraci reflects the context of those years, the way in which different interpretations of Schopenhauerian philosophy took their own shape as well as their development over time.

The first essay on Schopenhauer published in Italy dates back to 1858. It is the Dialogo su Schopenhauer e Leopardi written by Francesco De Sanctis. Later, the first phase of the dissemination of Schopenhauerian philosophy in Italy took place on two levels: through public divulgence by means of some cultural circles (e.g., the Florentine cultural circle of Malwida von Meysenbug and the Roman circle of Alessandro Costa) and Schopenhauerian reception was also promoted in the academic field through new handbooks of the history of philosophy, university lectures and some early, albeit partial, Italian translations of selected works of Schopenhauer. It is in this first phase that the two souls of Schopenhauerism, the illuministic and the romantic, take shape. Although he stressed the trouble to stringently and clearly distinguish the two tendencies, Ciraci accurately describes the process that led to the formation of these.

At that time, French culture promoted and spread new studies and researches all across Europe. Its relevance is also reflected in the translations of Schopenhauer’s works. In fact, French culture was not only responsible for the choice of works that were to be translated and thus spread throughout Europe, but French editions of these texts were also the reference texts for translations into other language. This is also true for the Italian translations of Schopenhauer’s writings, made on existing French translations and not on the basis of the original German texts. Thus, Ciraci writes:

This means going through the mediation of a culture that established, on the one hand, a line of continuity between the Schopenhauer of Aphorisms and the French moralists of the 18th century (by whom the philosopher of the World was explicitly inspired); on the other hand, it is an interpretation oriented towards spiritualism, which brought Schopenhauer’s ethics closer to Indian ascetic doctrines54.

In 1890, the relation between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and French moralists is reflected in the Italian translation of Metafisica dell’amore, that is, chap. 44 of the Supplements to the World, edited by Davide Monaco, who, in the introduction, describes Schopenhauer not as “a vain metaphysician” but as a “brilliant observer of nature, original moralist and clear and popular writer. His way of thinking and writing reminds of Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Vauvenargues and Chamfort55”. However – Ciraci underlines – the illuministic interpretation was born mainly in handbooks of the history of philosophy, in particular in Wilhelm Tennemann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, whose Italian translation dates back to 1855 and places Schopenhauer within the Neo-Kantian movement back to Kant [zurück zu Kant]. Following Tennemann, other handbooks of the time also propose a Kantian reading of Schopenhauer, thus presenting a philosophy focused on the theory of knowledge, on the foundation of morality and on the critique of customs. This holds true, for instance, for Francesco Fiorentino’s Manuale di storia della filosofia and Felice Tocco’s Lezioni di filosofia56. Moreover, the interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy developed in the Florentine cultural circle of the feminist intellectual Malwida von Meysenbug, who surrounded herself with prominent personalities such as Giacomo Barzelotti and Ettore Zoccoli, is illuministic. Besides these intellectuals, the illuministic trend of the first phase of

54 CIRACÌ, F. La filosofia italiana di fronte a Schopenhauer. La prima ricezione 1858-1914, cit., p. 120.
55 Id., p. 111, nota 148 e pp. sgg.
the reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the Italian culture also involved Helen Zimmern, Giovanni Papini, Giuseppe Vailati and Giuseppe Melli.

It is not possible here to analyze the way each of these thinkers interprets and develops the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer in-depth; nevertheless, it is sufficient to point out that, beyond the specific differences, the common features of all the followers with an illuministic soul are, on the one hand, the rejection of the metaphysics of the will and the irrational tendencies connected to it and, on the other hand, the affirmation of the primacy of a moral life and the tendency to place Schopenhauer in the tradition of Kantian philosophy.

As to the romantic Interpretation, one of its promoters was Oscar Chilesotti, who published the translation of the Fourth Book of the *World* and its *Supplements* in 1888, emphasizing Buddhist religious topics and, more generally, Schopenhauerian theories on redemption and asceticism^{57}. The interpretation proposed by the Roman cultural circle of Alessandro Costa is also romantic, highlighting and developing Schopenhauer’s theory of the primacy of music over other arts. In addition to Alessandro Costa and Oscar Chilesotti, the thinkers with a romantic soul belonging to the first phase of the reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Italy are Angelo Conti, Angelo De Gubernatis, Giuseppe De Lorenzo, Giovanni Amendola and Eva Kühn. Ciraci explains that the inclination to interpret Schopenhauer’s philosophy in a romantic way is expressed in various forms: from the attempt of Angelo Conti (member of Costa’s circle) to prove the primacy of aesthetic contemplation and the role of genius, to the interpretation of Schopenhauer as the Buddha of the West supported by Alessandro Costa, and to the inevitable spiritualistic and vitalist tendency of Amendola, who “turns to Schopenhauerian philosophy in search of a new paradigm, alternative to Kantian intellectualism” and “takes up the themes of Buddhist asceticism, also dear to Schopenhauerian morality” and with these instruments proposes “an inner revolution^{58}”.

Although with due caution, in this first phase, it is still possible to identify the promoters of either of the two soul of Schopenhauerism and to distinctly use the two historiographical categories, the illuministic and the romantic, to interpret the thought of each follower of Schopenhauer.

According to Ciraci, the same categories are applicable differently in the second phase of the first reception of Schopenhauer’s thought in Italy. Between 1903 and 1914, a convergence of the two souls of Schopenhauerism or, more precisely, a mixture of illuministic and romantic features in Schopenhauerian thinkers is detectable. This phenomenon is particularly clear in Piero Martinetti. Ciraci writes:

Proceeding from Kant, according to Martinetti, Schopenhauer develops a form of rationalism that takes into account, in a disenchanted manner, the misery of the world; thus making it possible to fight optimistic illusions, while at the same time offering a new dimension of the human being, addressing the inner life of man as a privileged way to access the realm of the spirit. From this point of view, Martinetti makes Schopenhauer both a rationalist philosopher in the Kantian sense and the undisputed master of a new form of spiritualism, which leads to a contemplative and mystical vision of the world. In doing so, Martinetti reassembles what we have defined as

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^{57} Id., pp. 117 e sgg.
^{58} Id., pp. 246-247.
the “two souls” of the Italian Schopenhauerism, the illuministic and the romantic59.

Some scholars of the second phase, who first had a clear illuministic or romantic tendency, developed their thoughts over time, as a result of the interaction of heterogeneous elements of a different historical-cultural context. Thus, Ciraci writes:

The correction of Kant with Schopenhauer and of Schopenhauer with Kant is characteristic of the Italian Schopenhauerism of this second phase: this holds true for Giovanni Amendola who, on the one hand, wants to overcome Kantian ethical formalism with Schopenhauerian vitalism and, on the other hand, aims to rectify Schopenhauer's irrational metaphysical will with the Kantian good will, which is autonomous and morally oriented. But this also applies to Giuseppe Melli, for whom, if Schopenhauer's solidaristic ethics exceeds Kant's ethical formalism, Schopenhauer's identification of the will with the thing in itself is likewise a mistake to be remedied in a Kantian way, limiting the will only to the realm of external and internal experience, without concessions to metaphysics60.

Ciraci finds the same evolution, albeit in different forms, also in the thoughts of Giovanni Papini, Angelo Conti, Eva Kühn and Alessandro Costa. The research ends with the irregular Schopenhauerians mentioned above: Giuseppe Rensi and Carlo Michelstaedter.

But, once again, despite the obvious differences between the many followers of Schopenhauer, including those mentioned in this paper en passant and others, so to speak, minor thinkers, to whom no space could be given here at all, all these Schopenhauerians worked and acted in the same historical-philosophical context. It is a historical moment characterized by very fragile balances: from the crisis of positivism to which the nascent Neo-Idealistic philosophy of Croce and Gentile is opposed, to the search for a different paradigm, which is the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Ciraci clearly highlights this point:

Schopenhauer's thought is recognized as an alternative to Hegelian Neo-Idealism. Although it is difficult to reduce it to a single current or interpretation, at least two major orientations coexist within it. Each develops in its own way what we have called the “two souls” of Schopenhauerism, the romantic and the illuministic. The first is linked to the reading of Schopenhauer as "Buddha of the West", which constantly characterizes the fortune of Schopenhauerian thought in Italy and which is variously developed into, on the one hand, occultism and esoterism and, on the other, spiritualism and idealism. The interpretation of the “Leonardian” intellectuals, who have developed Schopenhauer's philosophy in a pessimistic and skeptical way, in the new anti-metaphysical perspective of James' pragmatism, is instead related to a reading that could be defined as illuministic. However, these are paradigms with a faint outline, as it is demonstrated by the case of Martinetti and Amendola's interpretation, in which the two souls of Schopenhauerism blend, and as it is a fortiori proven by the readings of irregular thinkers hardly assignable to a school of thought, like the skeptic Rensi, who embraces the irrationalistic view of the

59 Id., p. 323. With regard to P. Martinetti, cf. also id., pp. 280 e sgg.
philosophy of the absurd; or like the negative metaphysician Michelstaedter who, distrustful of absolute values, recognizes in logic and science a powerful expression of the rhetoric that leads to an inauthentic existence. In these cases, the anti-dogmatic feature that characterizes both reflections does not culminate in illuministic positions, but leads to skepticism and to criticism of science, respectively.\(^6^3\)

The first Italian reception of Arthur Schopenhauer’s thought ends just before the beginning of the First World War, in 1914. In this year, the second full translation of *Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione* was published by Paolo Savj-Lopez\(^6^2\). Due to the impending war, the reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy leaves room for action and for the affirmation of life and it only re-emerges later, in 1943, with the debate on existentialism\(^6^3\).

## Conclusion

The result of the present analysis is twofold: first, it recognizes an interaction between the categories employed for the *Schüler* of the *Schopenhauer-Schule im weiteren Sinne* and those adopted more generally for the wider phenomenon of Schopenhauerism. In other words, it seems possible to approximate the so-called heretical thinkers of the *Schule* and the Schopenhauarian followers with an illuministic soul as well as the metaphysical Schopenhauarians and the followers who lean towards a romantic reading of the philosopher of the *World*. Second, it is also possible, as well as useful, to refer to the so-called two souls of Schopenhauerism as new and effective historiographical categories that facilitate the study and the interpretation of all the thinkers and followers (not only with reference to the Italian reception) who have encountered, admired, criticized and developed the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, contributing in various ways to its dissemination. However, is this not exactly a reflection of Schopenhauer’s educational background and studies that flow into his philosophy and reflect on subsequent developments of scholars and followers? The answer to this question, on the one hand, lies in the romantic view of Wackenroder and Novalis and, on the other hand, in the illuministic view of Voltaire and Rousseau, with regard to moral matters, and in Kant with regard to the theory of knowledge.\(^6^4\) This again reminds us of the meteorite metaphor, which Ciraci used to illustrate that “the Schopenhauer-Impact develops its matrixes in the effects, in two directions: the romantic Schopenhauerism and the illuministic Schopenhauerism”. Yet, this is a different story that certainly cannot be told in a few lines. Finally, we can only observe how the history of certain effects of a certain thought is linked to the history of the influences that have contributed to the formation and shaping of said thought. This shows that it might be a worthwhile endeavor to promote studies in this direction.

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\(^6^1\) Id., p. 525.  
\(^6^3\) Cf. CIRACÌ, F. *La filosofia italiana di fronte a Schopenhauer. La prima ricezione 1858-1914*, cit., pp. 583 and sgg.  
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