The logical interpretation of Plato’s *Parmenides* in the Middle Platonism

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**Abstract:** In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the *Parmenides* was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the *Parmenides* of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordace: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ *Didaskalikos* (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ *Vitae Philosophorum* (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (*Isagoge*, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the *Parmenides*, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ιπρετηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.

**Keywords:** *Parmenides*; Middle Platonism; Proclus; Logical interpretation

**Resumo:** Neste artigo, mostrei alguns argumentos que reforçam a ideia de que o *Parmêntides* foi considerado um diálogo lógico durante o médio platonismo. Vou considerar o que alguns autores dizem, embora em diferentes épocas, sobre como o *Parmêntides* de Platão foi lido. Meu objetivo é também mostrar que eles estiveram em um acordo geral: na verdade, dadas essas concordâncias, a probabilidade de que esta obra tenha sido classificada entre os diálogos lógicos se torna muito mais plausible. A principal fonte para estabelecer isso é representada por Proclo, que, em seu Comentário sobre o *Parmêntides* de Platão, discute as tradições de interpretação relacionadas a este diálogo, propondo uma classificação na qual também está incluído o ‘modo lógico’. Com base na análise de algumas passagens do *Didaskalikos* de Alcino (cap. 6) e de algumas referências presentes na *Vitae Philosophorum* de Diogenes Laércio (III, 49), e com algumas indicações em Albino (*Isagoge*, III, 148, 19 e segs., VI, 151, 5-7), é possível supor com certo grau de verdade que o *Parmêntides*, para alguns médios platonistas, em alguns aspectos, e mais geralmente para o médio platonismo, representava um ‘diálogo explicativo’ ou ‘diálogo expositivo’ (ιπρετηματικός) que continha as indicações para aprender o método lógico, fornecendo ao mesmo tempo um exemplo de como se exercitar para aprendê-lo.

**Palavras-chave:** *Parmêntides*; Médio platonismo; Proclo; Interpretação lógica

The first commentators who tried to interpret the *Parmenides* of Plato have understood it as a ‘logical’ dialogue. There are sufficient proofs for establishing that Platonists, particularly the so-called ‘Middleplatonists’, basically read the *Parmenides* as a dialogue whose content essentially coincided with a logical exercise, or sometimes related to the logic in its strict sense.

In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the *Parmenides* was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will gather these arguments by some authors who, in a more or less explicit manner, show to understand the *Parmenides* in a logical sense. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the *Parmenides* of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main
source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’.

Therefore, the most important evidence that leads us to defend the existence of a logical ‘middleplatonic’ tendency, actualized in a specific way of reading of the *Parmenides*, is traceable in Proclus. In his Commentary to the *Parmenides*, indeed, Proclus informs us about the various readings of the *Parmenides* of Plato by tracing a brief history of its previous interpretations. In this way, Proclus recognises three lines of understanding the *Parmenides*: the logical one, the metaphysical one and the theological one. This classification allow us to seriously consider that the exegetical tradition of the *Parmenides* in the Middle Platonism has been more structured than we get used to think (especially as when we reflect on the Middle Platonism we are used to refer to the *Timaeus*, or perhaps to the *Republic*, that certainly have had a more important role among Platonists of Imperial Era). Anyway, taking the cue from the Proclus’ classification, I want to analyse the logical reading of the *Parmenides* because, as we will see, it is likely that the very logic (and the logical method) has represented the interpretation-key for the reception of the *Parmenides* in the Middle Platonism.

Going back to Proclus’ Commentary on the *Parmenides*, we find that the three lines he classified are not well defined and, additionally, Proclus does not include the names of the interpreters. Those who interpreted the *Parmenides* as a logical dialogue, in addition, disagreed with some aspects. As reported by Proclus², someone thought that the *Parmenides* constituted a reply to Zeno’s book, which contained forty arguments to demonstrate the impossibility of admitting the multiplicity of being. According to these authors, Plato would have formed a sort of method against the Eleatic philosophers, particularly against Zeno, showing how the dialectical method (about which the second part of the *Parmenides* would show an example) would be superior to that used by Zeno². Such interpretations have been supported by some authors who wanted to affirm the presence in the *Parmenides* of a refutation (άντιγραφή), or a reaction formulated against the Zenonian discourse and method (namely the Zenonian argument against plurality). According to these anonymous commentators, Plato would have practiced in the *Parmenides* the same type of άντιγραφή he has experimented in the *Menexenus*, where Plato imitated the funeral prayer pronounced by Thucydides but outperforming the style of arguments and the clarity of the expression. For the *Menexenus* would only contain a speech in honour of those who receive state funerals, therefore Plato would not write this dialogue to exhibit a particular philosophical content but only to rivalry against Thucydides, resuming his oration (imitating it), but in such a way that it would turn out to be qualitatively better⁴. For some of these interpreters then, in the *Parmenides* Plato would be showing an example of this kind of άντιγραφή arguing with

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¹ Procl. *In Prm.*, 631.11-641.14 (See STEEL, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon*; Id., *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria*; LUNA & SEONDS [éd.], *Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon*.)

² Procl. *In Prm.*, 631.21-632.27.

³ On the appropriation by Plato of the Zeno’s method in the *Parmenides*, see GOURINAT, *La dialectique des hypothèses contraires dans le Parménide de Platon*, pp. 233-261.


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Zeno. They grounded this opinion on the certainty that Plato, in the Parmenides, was carrying out a refutation conducted through the use of the logical arguments contained in the second part of the dialogue.

According to Proclus, the second ‘trend’ of the logical interpretation of the Parmenides is represented by the ancient commentators who divided the dialogue in three main sections (κεφάλαια): the first one (= Prm. 130a3-133c7): containing apories against the theory of Forms; the second one (= Prm. 135c8-137c3): focusing on the description of the method necessary to grasp the Truths (namely the Ideas); the third and the last one (= Prm. 137c4-166c5): that consists in the exercise of the method presented. Those who did this distinction refused to identify the Parmenides as a controversial dialogue (as did the first group of interpreters), being convinced that the three sections of the dialogue had the purpose of training in the dialectical exercise (ἀσκησις γυμνασίας). In fact, the hypothesis of the One, as put forth by Parmenides, represents for them an example of the execution of the exercise and would not, instead, constitute its very purpose. In this last case, the hypothesis would play in the Parmenides the same role of the ‘fisherman example’ presented at the beginning of the Sophist in view of the exercise of the method of the diairesis. It would seem, moreover, that not all the supporters of the logical interpretation have identified the γυμνασία with the dialectical method, which, according to some interpreters, would be absent in the Parmenides, recognising in it only the logical gymnastics. Some philosophers, in fact, thought that in the logical exercise contained in the Parmenides, Plato has jointly proposed an anticipation of the technique of argumentation that would be later developed by Aristotle, in Topics (Top. VII 14, 163a37b-13). In this sense, it appears that Aristotle has been the only one to resume the technique of speeches from the Platonic Parmenides and to propose it, from his point of view, in the Topics.

Anyway, the advocates of the idea that the exercise of the Parmenides has to be identified with a simple training useful to develop a discourse technique reject the presence

5 Plat. Prm. 137b1-166c.
6 Procl. In Prm., 634.8-634.17: “Τριον γὰρ ὄντων, ὡς κατὰ μεγάλα διελθεῖν, τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ κεφαλαίων, σύντομο γὰρ ἑκείνοι διαμορφῶσιν, ὡς ἐν μέν ἐστὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἓπειρον ἀπόριας προτείνουν, ἐν δὲ τῇ τῆς μεθόδου σύντομοι παράδοσιν ποιοῦμεν, δὲ ἡ αὐξή γυμνασίας τούτης τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοσοφήματι, ἐν δὲ τὴν μεθόδον αὐτῆς ὡς ἐπὶ παραδείγματος τοῦ κατὰ Παρμενίδην ἰδιός γνώμονας ἀπεργαζόμενον, πάντα πρὸς ἐν βλέπειν ταῦτα, τήν τῆς γυμνασίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀσκήσιν”.
7 See STEEL, Proclus and l’interprétation ‘logique’ du Parménide, p. 68.
8 See also Arist. Top. I, 2, 101a34-36: “πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὡς δυνάμειν πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπραγιαῖα τάδοτα ὡς ἐκάκτους κατοφύμεθα τάλθης τε καὶ τὸ ἔθος”. In this passage Aristotle states that when we are able to develop an aporia, arguing in one way and another, we will be even more able to discern the true from the false (κατοφύμεθα τάλθης) in every arguments. What Aristotle here says can represent an example of the kind of the exercise that some authors recognised in the Parmenides; compare with the passage 136c2-5: “καὶ τὰλα ἀκτὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἐν προαιρετῇ ἄλλῳ ὡς ἐν ὑποψίᾳ ὑπετίθεον, ἀντι ὡς μὴ ὡς, τί Μέλλης τέλεος γυμνασίαμον κυρίως διόφθεγμα νὰ ἀληθῆς”. In fact, Aristotle also calls the “method” just described as a γυμνασία: “which will make it simple to argue on the proposed subject”; see Arist. Top. 101a28-30: “ὅτι μὲν ὡς πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφαίνεις ἄστι-μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ἴδιον περὶ τοῦ προσευκτός ἐπεχείρην δυνάμεθα”. Based on this parallel, the method of the Parmenides would be superior to that one of Aristotle because that the latter in the Topics would argue on ἐνδοξά (commonly shared opinions), while Plato in the Parmenides would propose universal rules (καθολικοὶ κανόνες) to reach the truth. For the latter argument, see STEEL, Proclus et l’interprétation ‘logique’… p. 72.
9 A confirmation of this argument would be present in Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, commenting on Aristotle’s Topics and referring to the γυμνασία of which Aristotle speaks, states that the description of this method (‘which will make it simple to argue on the proposed subject’) agrees with what Plato writes in the Parmenides in so far as: how bodily exercises made according to a specific technique provide a good constitution to the body, likewise, the exercises in the subjects performed by the soul are made according to a method, giving a good shape to the soul. The good form for the rational soul would correspond to the ability to examine (κρίνω) and discover the truth. See Alex. Aphr. In Top. p. 27, 27-31, Wallies (CAG 2.2).
in the *Parmenides* of the Platonic dialectical method. This rejection stems from the fact that, in the *Parmenides*, the method proposed by the old Parmenides to the young Socrates, and then carried out with the help of the young Aristotle, would not respect what Plato himself said elsewhere about dialectics. In the *Republic*, indeed, it is explicitly said that it is not suitable for young people\(^9\), and, in general, the method described in the *Parmenides*, according to the proponents of this thesis, would not present none of the typical features of Platonic dialectics as presented by Plato, especially in the *Republic*, in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Sophist*\(^10\). Therefore, the exercise would only coincide with dialectic gymnastics, meaning the latter as the technique of ‘well discuss’.

Since Proclus did not give any name for those who support the various logical interpretations, we cannot understand who he is referring to from time to time, nor we can ascertain when the interpreters mentioned should be placed. C. Steel thinks that the first commentators that found a ‘logical’ dialogue in the *Parmenides* were probably the philosophers of the first century AD, contemporaries of Thrasyllus, who saw in the *Parmenides*, especially its second part, a dialectical exercise executed according to the Eleatic method (the Zenonian one)\(^12\). On the other hand, during the Imperial Era, Platonic philosophers had rediscovered the dogmatic character of Platonic philosophy and were intended to affirm some doctrinal aspects of it after a long period of a widespread ‘aporetic’ reading of Platonic dialogues. It is therefore probable that the philosophers of this era were trying to recognise in the *Parmenides* a precise doctrinal aspect of Plato. The ‘logical’ aspect (concerning the logic) seems to be the most likely one.

Having established that Proclus fully recognises the presence of a logical interpretation of the *Parmenides*, in addition to this, there is further evidence that allowing us to delve into the logical aspect of the middleplatonist exegesis of the *Parmenides*.

In the classification of the platonic dialogues, which we know thanks to Diogenes Laertius’ *Vitae Philosophorum* and to Albinus’ *Eisagoge*, it emerges that Plato’s dialogues were basically divided into two groups\(^13\). We find that, on the one hand, there were the ‘instructive’ or ‘explanatory’ dialogues, ‘ὁφημητικοί’\(^14\), which give instructions on some topics, such as on nature, λόγος, politics or ethics; on the other hand, we find the ‘investigative’ dialogues, ‘ζητητικοί’, which concern with starting a research on a specific issue, often examining the arguments ‘for and against’. These two groups, in turn, have been further split into two kind: the first divided in ‘theoretical’, ‘θεωρητικοί’, which regard physical and logical questions, and in ‘practical’ dialogues, ‘πρακτικοί’, that debate on ethical and political matters\(^15\). This second group of dialogues were instead divided in the dialogues that served to counteract an opposing thesis (‘ἀγωνιστικοί’) and those that permitted the participants in the dialogue (as well as the readers) to exercise themselves in a certain technique (‘γυμναστικοί’). Ultimately both the last groups were divided again: the ‘γυμναστικοί’ into the ‘μαυριτικοί’ dialogues, whose purpose was to help the interlocutor to bring out (to give birth) his implicit knowledge, such as in the *Alcibiades* where Socrates helps the young Alcibiades to articulate his vague knowledge; and into the ‘πειραστικοί’

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\(^9\) Plat. R. VII 537e-539d.


\(^12\) See STEEL, *Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide…*, p. 24

\(^13\) See BALTES & DÖRRIE, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*. II, pp. 48-50; NÜSSER, Albinus Prolog und die Dialogtheorie des Platonismus; TARRANT, Thrasyllan Platonism; MANSFELD, Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text, pp. 82-89; STEEL, *Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide…*, pp. 27-28.

\(^14\) The term ‘ὁφημητικοί’ is the opposite of the term ‘ἀπορητικός’; see LIDDELL; SCOTT & STUART JONES, *A Greek–English Lexicon*.

dialogues, which consisted in verifying the reliability of a thesis, as in the case of the *Theaetetus*; as last division, the ‘ἀγωνιστικοί’ were classified in ‘ἐνδεικτικοί’, that represented the ‘probative’ dialogues (for example the *Protagoras*) and in ‘ἀνατρεπτικοί’, that were the ‘aversive’ ones, as was classified the *Gorgias*. The ensuing diagram summarises these subdivisions:

![Diagram of Platonic dialogues]

According to this subdivision, we would expect the *Parmenides* to be among the ‘γυμναστικοί’ dialogues, but, as far as we know, it was not so. Diogenes Laertius and Albinus place the *Parmenides* among the logical dialogues (‘λογικοί’) along with the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* (or *Politicus*) and the *Cratylus*, and, surprisingly, we learn that the logical dialogues are placed in the midst of the ψηφητικοί ones. Albinus and Diogenes Laertius, in this way, provide us with an important clue about the way in which the *Parmenides* was read in the Middle Platonism, a clue showing an interesting albeit partial convergence with the Proclean testimony. Indeed, the *Parmenides* was part of those Platonic dialogues that gave an instruction on Plato’s doctrine and, in the specific case of the *Parmenides*, the doctrine recognised was about the logic. The *Parmenides*, therefore, along with the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* and the *Cratylus*, would have contained a logical teaching, providing an instruction on the various (correct) ways of knowing the truth. Most likely, it is for this reason that Alcinous in his *Didaskalikos* uses the *Parmenides* precisely to illustrate the Platonic logic (ch. VI). Indeed, Alcinous, an important middleplatonist philosopher, of which we have scarce news but whose ‘Didaskalikos’ (also known as the ‘Handbook of Platonism’) represents a work of extreme importance for the Imperial Platonism, uses not for nothing the Plato’s *Parmenides* to explain the theory of Aristotelian syllogism as well as

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66 See STEEL, *Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide…*, pp. 27-28. See also the reconstruction of M. Baltes, in BALTES & DÖRRIE, *Der Platonismus in der Antike…, II*, pp. 513-520.
67 This is because if we think at the dialectical exercise contained in the *Parmenides*, it would be natural to link this dialogue to its ‘gymnastic aspect’.
69 Alb. *Prol.* III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7. However, it is worthy of note that Albinus himself (in the third chapter) in the classification he makes of Platonic works puts the *Parmenides* among the ‘ἐλεγχτικοί’ dialogues. See Alb. *Prol.* III. 14-15.
of the ‘ten categories’ doctrine. First of all, an important thing to note about Alcinous is that his quotation of some sections of Plato’s Parmenides represents a rarity since we have just two direct references to it during the Middle Platonism (namely the Alcinous’ passages contained in his Didaskalikos and an other one we find in the Platonist Cavenus Taurus, as reported by his pupil Aulus Gellius in the seventh book of his Attic Nights)\textsuperscript{20}. Anyway, in chapter six of his work, Alcinous recurs to some sections of the deductive series contained in the logical exercise of the Parmenides. This dialogue, in particular, constituted for Alcinous a repertoire of examples and illustrations for the theory of the syllogism, which, in turn, constitutes one of the branches of the dialectical science. Alcinous points out that for each type of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical and mixed (οἱ κατηγορικοί; οἱ ὑποθετικοί; οἱ μυκτοί), Plato has already provided instances. In the same way, Plato has depicted in the Parmenides the doctrine of the ten categories (Καὶ μὴν τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἐν τὸ τῶν Παρμενιδῆ καὶ ἐν ᾧλίοις ὑπεδείξενε)\textsuperscript{21}. All this goes to show that for Alcinous the Parmenides was acknowledged as a logical dialogue.

It can be assumed that Alcinous interpreted the Parmenides in the same manner as Diogenes Laertius and Albinus did, intending for ‘logical’ that it was part of the dialogues ὑφηγητικοί. The Parmenides, therefore, did give instructions on dialectics and in particular on the use of syllogism, which in turn is necessary for the correct use of the λόγος. It is probable that it was for the same reason that Albinus argued that the ‘logical dialogues’ could also be understood as a typology of the ‘investigative dialogues’ (ᾼητητικοί)\textsuperscript{22}, to the extent that they would examine a particular issue and that, while practicing in an exercise (namely, a logical — or dialectical — exercise), they would not lose their instructive nature (that is about the logic tout court).

A further indication to understand how the middleplatonic philosophers considered the Parmenides as a logical dialogue is traceable in Galenus. It seems, in fact, that Galenus, who possessed a good knowledge of the logical works of Aristotle, and, more generally, which had a great interest in logic, considered the Parmenides as a logical dialogue of which he composed some ἐπιτομαί, now lost but known by the Arabs\textsuperscript{23}. Even Galenus, so, would have seen in the Parmenides a treatise of logic.

Based on the information displayed, it is possible to hypothesize with some confidence that the Parmenides for some middleplatonic authors represented an expository dialogue (ὑφηγητικὸς) that contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time provides an example of how to practice in order to learn it.

This result allows us to draw some historical-philosophical conclusions also inherent at the history of interpretation of the ancient texts. In fact, it is known that the Parmenides did not play a prominent role during the Middle Platonism. The Timaeus, on the other hand, was the capital text for imperial-era authors who planned to systematize the Platonic thinking and to dogmatize its main aspects. The reason for the absence of direct quotations of the Parmenides in the Middle Platonism is allegedly related to the way in which this dialogue was interpreted. Being understood predominantly as a logical dialogue, meaning logic in its aspect of ‘exercise’ (as training required for a rigorous use of dialectics), and in its properly logical sense (in the narrow sense of the term), this has determined that the Parmenides was not sufficiently suitable to be used in a weighty way for the purpose of making Platonic thinking unitary and systematic. The difficulties that distinguish the


\textsuperscript{21} Alc. Did. 159, 43-44.

\textsuperscript{22} Alb. Prog. VI, 151, 5-7. See MANSFELD, Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled..., n. 138.

\textsuperscript{23} The Fihrist, composed in the 10th century by the bibliographer Ibn al-Adim, mentions a compendium of the Parmenides attributed to Galenus, alongside a collection of logical treatises (together with the Cratylus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Euthydemos).
Parmenides and that concern both the identification of the theme and the unity of the script have most likely determined the secondary role (though not entirely) of the dialogue in the middleplatonic tradition. The centrality of the Timaeus, on the contrary, could be explained on the basis of the topics that peculiarly mark this work. In fact, it traces the outlines of Platonic ontology and epistemology, reinforced by the cosmological argument. All this guarantees the presence of a wide range of contents required by the endeavour to systematization that the Parmenides, unlike the Timaeus, could not easily provide.

References


