Submissão: 03/04/2020 Aprovação: 03/04/2020
Publicação: 15/04/2020
Dossiê O Parmênides,
de Platão
The logical
interpretation of Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Platonism
A interpretação
lógica do Parmênides de Platão no médio platonismo
Chiara Bonuglia
Professora de Filosofia na Universidade de Salerno,
Salerno, Itália
Abstract:
In this paper, I will show some arguments that
reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during
the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in
different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also
to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these
concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical
dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is
represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses
about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing
a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of
the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some
references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum
(III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge,
III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain
degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists,
in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism,
represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the
logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise
in order to learn it.
Keywords:
Parmenides; Middle Platonism;
Proclus; Logical interpretation
Resumo: Neste
artigo, mostrarei alguns argumentos que reforçam a ideia de que o Parmênides
foi considerado um diálogo lógico durante o médio platonismo. Vou considerar o
que alguns autores dizem, embora em diferentes épocas, sobre como o Parmênides
de Platão foi lido. Meu objetivo é também mostrar que eles estiveram em um
acordo geral: na verdade, dadas essas concordâncias, a probabilidade de que
esta obra tenha sido classificada entre os diálogos lógicos se torna muito mais
plausível. A principal fonte para estabelecer isso é representada por Proclo, que, em seu Comentário sobre o Parmênides de
Platão, discute as tradições de interpretação relacionadas a este diálogo,
propondo uma classificação na qual também está incluído o ‘modo lógico’. Com
base na análise de algumas passagens do Didaskalikos
de Alcino (cap. 6) e de algumas referências presentes na Vitae Philosophorum de Diógenes Laércio (III, 49), e com algumas
indicações em Albino (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 e segs.,
VI, 151, 5-7), é possível supor com certo grau de verdade que o Parmênides,
para alguns médios platonistas, em alguns aspectos, e
mais geralmente para o médio platonismo, representava um ‘diálogo explicativo’
ou ‘diálogo expositivo’ (ὑφεγηματικός) que continha
as indicações para aprender o método lógico, fornecendo ao mesmo tempo um
exemplo de como se exercitar para aprendê-lo.
Palavras-Chave: Parmênides;
Médio platonismo; Proclo; Interpretação lógica
The first commentators who tried to
interpret the Parmenides of Plato
have understood it as a ‘logical’ dialogue. There are sufficient proofs for
establishing that Platonists, particularly the so-called ‘Middleplatonists’,
basically read the Parmenides as a
dialogue whose content essentially coincided with a logical exercise, or
sometimes related to the logic in its strict sense.
In this paper, I will show some arguments
that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides
was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will gather
these arguments by some authors who, in a more or less explicit manner, show to
understand the Parmenides in a
logical sense. I will consider what some authors say, although in different
ages, about how the Parmenides of
Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general
accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work
was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The
main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his
Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides,
discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue,
proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’.
Therefore, the most important evidence
that leads us to defend the existence of a logical ‘middleplatonic’
tendency, actualized in a specific way of reading of the Parmenides, is traceable in Proclus. In his Commentary to the Parmenides[1],
indeed, Proclus informs us about the various readings of the Parmenides of Plato by tracing a brief
history of its previous interpretations. In this way, Proclus recognises three
lines of understanding the Parmenides:
the logical one, the metaphysical one and the theological one. This
classification allow us to seriously consider that the exegetical tradition of
the Parmenides in the Middle
Platonism has been more structured than we get used to think (especially as
when we reflect on the Middle Platonism we are used to refer to the Timaeus, or
perhaps to the Republic, that certainly
have had a more important role among Platonists of Imperial Era). Anyway,
taking the cue from the Proclus’ classification, I want to analyse the logical
reading of the Parmenides because, as
we will see, it is likely that the very logic (and the logical method) has
represented the interpretation-key for the reception of the Parmenides in the Middle Platonism.
Going back to Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides, we find that the three lines
he classified are not well defined and, additionally, Proclus does not include
the names of the interpreters. Those who interpreted the Parmenides as a logical dialogue, in addition, disagreed with some
aspects. As reported by Proclus[2],
someone thought that the Parmenides
constituted a reply to Zeno’s book, which contained forty arguments to
demonstrate the impossibility of admitting the multiplicity of being. According
to these authors, Plato would have formed a sort of method against the Eleatic
philosophers, particularly against Zeno, showing how the dialectical method
(about which the second part of the Parmenides
would show an example) would be superior to that used by Zeno[3].
Such interpretations have been supported by some authors who wanted to affirm
the presence in the Parmenides of a
refutation (ἀντιγραφή), or a reaction
formulated against the Zenonian discourse and method
(namely the Zenonian argument against plurality).
According to these anonymous commentators, Plato would have practiced in the Parmenides the same type of ἀντιγραφή he has experimented
in the Menexenus,
where Plato imitated the funeral prayer pronounced by Thucydides but
outperforming the style of arguments and the clarity of the expression. For the
Menexenus
would only contain a speech in honour of those who receive state funerals,
therefore Plato would not write this dialogue to exhibit a particular
philosophical content but only to rivalry against Thucydides, resuming his
oration (imitating it), but in such a way that it would turn out to be
qualitatively better[4]. For some of these interpreters then, in the Parmenides Plato would be showing an example of this kind of ἀντιγραφή arguing with Zeno. They grounded this opinion on the
certainty that Plato, in the Parmenides,
was carrying out a refutation conducted through the use of the logical arguments
contained in the second part of the dialogue[5].
According to Proclus, the second ‘trend’
of the logical interpretation of the Parmenides
is represented by the ancient commentators who divided the dialogue in three
main sections (κεφάλαια): the first one (= Prm. 130a3-135c7): containing apories against
the theory of Forms; the second one (= Prm. 135c8-137c3): focusing on the description of the method necessary to
grasp the Truths (namely the Ideas); the third and the last one (= Prm. 137c4-166c5): that consists in the exercise of the method presented.
Those who did this distinction refused to identify the Parmenides as a controversial dialogue (as did the first group of
interpreters), being convinced that the three
sections of the dialogue had the purpose of training in the dialectical
exercise (ἄσκησις γυμνασίας)[6]. In fact, the
hypothesis of the One, as put forth by Parmenides, represents for them an example of the execution of the exercise and
would not, instead, constitute its very purpose.
In this last case, the hypothesis would play in the Parmenides the same role of the ‘fisherman example’ presented at
the beginning of the Sophist in view
of the exercise of the method of the diairesis[7].
It would seem, moreover, that not all the supporters of the logical
interpretation have identified the γυμνασία with the dialectical method, which, according to some
interpreters, would be absent in the Parmenides,
recognising in it only the logical gymnastics. Some philosophers, in fact,
thought that in the logical exercise contained in the Parmenides, Plato has jointly proposed
an anticipation of the technique of argumentation that would be later developed
by Aristotle, in Topics (Top. VII 14, 163a37b-13)[8].
In this sense, it appears that Aristotle has been the only one to resume the
technique of speeches from the Platonic Parmenides
and to propose it, from his point of view, in the Topics[9].
Anyway, the advocates of the idea that the
exercise of the Parmenides has to be
identified with a simple training useful to develop a discourse technique
reject the presence in the Parmenides
of the Platonic dialectical method. This rejection stems from the fact that, in
the Parmenides, the method proposed
by the old Parmenides to the young Socrates, and then carried out with the help
of the young Aristotle, would not respect what Plato himself said elsewhere
about dialectics. In the Republic,
indeed, it is explicitly said that it is not suitable for young people[10],
and, in general, the method described in the Parmenides, according to the proponents of this thesis, would not
present none of the typical features of Platonic
dialectics as presented by Plato, especially in the Republic, in the Phaedrus
and in the Sophist[11]. Therefore,
the exercise would only coincide with dialectic gymnastics, meaning the latter
as the technique of ‘well discuss’.
Since Proclus did not give any name for
those who support the various logical interpretations, we cannot understand who
he is referring to from time to time, nor we can
ascertain when the interpreters mentioned should be placed. C. Steel thinks
that the first commentators that found a ‘logical’ dialogue in the Parmenides were probably the
philosophers of the first century AD, contemporaries of Thrasyllus,
who saw in the Parmenides, especially
its second part, a dialectical exercise executed according to the Eleatic
method (the Zenonian one)[12].
On the other hand, during the Imperial Era, Platonic philosophers had
rediscovered the dogmatic character of Platonic philosophy and were intended to
affirm some doctrinal aspects of it after a long period of a widespread ‘aporetic’
reading of Platonic dialogues. It is therefore probable that the philosophers
of this era were trying to recognise in the Parmenides
a precise doctrinal aspect of Plato. The ‘logical’ aspect (concerning the
logic) seems to be the most likely one.
Having established that Proclus fully
recognises the presence of a logical interpretation of the Parmenides, in addition to this, there is further evidence that
allowing us to delve into the logical aspect of the middleplatonic
exegesis of the Parmenides.
In the classification of the platonic
dialogues, which we know thanks to Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum and to Albinus’ Eisagoge, it emerges that Plato’s dialogues were basically
divided into two groups[13].
We find that, on the one hand, there were the ‘instructive’ or ‘explanatory’
dialogues, ‘ὑφηγητικοί’[14],
which give instructions on some topics, such as on nature, λόγος, politics or ethics; on the other hand, we find the ‘investigative’ dialogues, ‘ζητητικοί’, which concern with
starting a research on a specific issue, often examining the arguments ‘for and
against’. These two groups, in turn, have been further split into two kind: the first divided in ‘theoretical’, ‘θεωρηματικοί’, which regard
physical and logical questions, and in ‘practical’ dialogues, ‘πρακτικοί, that debate on ethical and political matters[15].
This second group of dialogues were instead divided in the dialogues that
served to counteract an opposing thesis (‘ἀγωνιστικοί’) and those that
permitted the participants in the dialogue (as well as the readers) to exercise
themselves in a certain technique (‘γυμναστικοί’). Ultimately both
the last groups were divided again: the ‘γυμναστικοί’ into the ‘μαιευτικοί’ dialogues, whose
purpose was to help the interlocutor to bring out (to give birth) his implicit
knowledge, such as in the Alcibiades
where Socrates helps the young Alcibiades to articulate his vague knowledge;
and into the ‘πειραστικοί’ dialogues, which consisted in verifying the
reliability of a thesis, as in the case of the Theaetetus[16];
as last division, the ‘ἀγωνιστικοί’ were classified in ‘ἐνδεικτικοί’, that represented
the ‘probative’ dialogues (for example the Protagoras)
and in ‘ἀνατρεπτικοί’, that were the ‘aversive’ ones, as
was classified the Gorgias. The ensuing diagram summarises these subdivisions:
|
Platonic
dialogues |
|||||
|
ὑφηγητικοί (λογικοί) |
ζητητικοί |
||||
|
θεωρηματικοί |
πρακτικοί |
ἀγωνιστικοί |
γυμναστικοί |
||
|
|
|
ἐνδεικτικοί |
ἀνατρεπτικοί |
μαιευτικοί |
πειραστικοί |
According to this subdivision, we would
expect the Parmenides to be among the
‘γυμναστικοί’ dialogues[17],
but, as far as we know, it was not so. Diogenes Laertius[18]
and Albinus[19]
place the Parmenides among the
logical dialogues (‘λογικοί’) along with the Sophist, the Statesman (or Politicus) and the Cratylus, and, surprisingly, we learn that the logical
dialogues are placed in the midst of the ὑφηγητικοί ones. Albinus and Diogenes Laertius, in this way,
provide us with an important clue about the way in which the Parmenides was read in the Middle
Platonism, a clue showing an interesting albeit partial convergence with the Proclean testimony. Indeed, the Parmenides was part of those Platonic dialogues that gave an
instruction on Plato's doctrine and, in the specific case of the Parmenides, the
doctrine recognised was about the logic. The Parmenides, therefore, along with the Sophist, the Statesman
and the Cratylus,
would have contained a logical teaching, providing an instruction on the
various (correct) ways of knowing the truth. Most likely, it is for this reason
that Alcinous in his Didaskalikos uses the Parmenides precisely to illustrate the
Platonic logic (ch. VI). Indeed, Alcinous,
an important middleplatonic philosopher, of which we
have scarce news but whose ‘Didaskalikos’ (also known
as the ‘Handbook of Platonism’) represents a work of extreme importance for the
Imperial Platonism, uses not for nothing the Plato’s Parmenides to explain the theory of Aristotelian syllogism as well
as of the ‘ten categories’ doctrine. First of all, an important thing to note
about Alcinous is that his quotation of some sections
of Plato’s Parmenides represents a
rarity since we have just two direct references to it during the Middle
Platonism (namely the Alcinous’ passages contained in
his Didaskalikos
and an other one we find in the Platonist Cavenus Taurus, as reported by his pupil Aulus Gellius in the seventh book
of his Attic Nights)[20].
Anyway, in chapter six of his work, Alcinous recurs
to some sections of the deductive series contained in the logical exercise of
the Parmenides. This dialogue, in
particular, constituted for Alcinous a repertoire of
examples and illustrations for the theory of the syllogism, which, in turn,
constitutes one of the branches of the dialectical science. Alcinous
points out that for each type of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical and mixed
(οἱ κατηγορικοί; οἱ ὑποθετικοί; οἱ μικτοί), Plato has already provided instances. In the same way,
Plato has depicted in the Parmenides
the doctrine of the ten categories (Καὶ μὴν τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἔν τε τῷ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπέδειξεν[21]). All this goes to show that for Alcinous
the Parmenides was acknowledged as a
logical dialogue.
It can be assumed that Alcinous
interpreted the Parmenides in the
same manner as Diogenes Laertius and Albinus did, intending for ‘logical’ that
it was part of the dialogues ὑφηγητικοί. The Parmenides,
therefore, did give instructions on dialectics and in particular on the use of
syllogism, which in turn is necessary for the correct use of the λόγος. It is probable that it was for the same reason that
Albinus argued that the ‘logical dialogues’ could also be understood as a
typology of the ‘investigative dialogues’ (ζητητικοί)[22], to the extent that they would examine a particular
issue and that, while practicing in an exercise (namely, a logical ¾ or dialectical ¾ exercise), they
would not lose their instructive nature (that is about the logic tout court).
A further indication to understand how the
middleplatonic philosophers considered the Parmenides as a logical dialogue is
traceable in Galenus. It seems, in fact, that Galenus, who possessed a good knowledge of the logical
works of Aristotle, and, more generally, which had a great interest in logic,
considered the Parmenides as a
logical dialogue of which he composed some ἐπιτομαί, now lost but known
by the Arabs[23].
Even Galenus, so, would have seen in the Parmenides a treatise of logic.
Based on the information displayed, it is
possible to hypothesize with some confidence that the Parmenides for some middleplatonic
authors represented an expository dialogue (ὑφεγητικός) that contained the indications to learn the logical
method, while at the same time provides an example of how to practice in order
to learn it.
This result allows us to draw some
historical-philosophical conclusions also inherent at the history of
interpretation of the ancient texts. In fact, it is known that the Parmenides did not play a prominent role
during the Middle Platonism. The Timaeus, on the other hand, was the capital text for
imperial-era authors who planned to systematize the Platonic thinking and to
dogmatize its main aspects. The reason for the absence of direct quotations of
the Parmenides in the Middle
Platonism is allegedly related to the way in which this dialogue was
interpreted. Being understood predominantly as a logical dialogue, meaning
logic in its aspect of ‘exercise’ (as training required for a rigorous use of
dialectics), and in its properly logical sense (in the narrow sense of the
term), this has determined that the Parmenides
was not sufficiently suitable to be used in a weighty way for the purpose of
making Platonic thinking unitary and systematic. The difficulties that
distinguish the Parmenides and that
concern both the identification of the theme and the unity of the script have
most likely determined the secondary role (though not entirely) of the dialogue
in the middleplatonic tradition. The centrality of the Timaeus, on the contrary, could
be explained on the basis of the topics that peculiarly mark this work. In
fact, it traces the outlines of Platonic ontology and epistemology, reinforced
by the cosmological argument. All this guarantees
the presence of a wide range of contents required by the endeavour to systematization
that the Parmenides, unlike the Timaeus, could
not easily provide.
ALCINOUS. The Handbook of Platonism. Translated with
an Introduction and Commentary by John Dillon. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993.
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS. In Aristotelis Topicorum
libros octo commentaria. WALLIES, M. (ed.). Comm. in Arist.
Graeca ii pars ii. Berlin, 1891.
AULUS GELLIUS. The Attic Nights. 3 vols,
Translated by J. C. Rolf. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989.
BALTES, M. & DÖRRIE, H. Der Platonismus in der Antike. II. Der hellenistische Rahmen des
kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus. Bausteine 36-72: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar. Stuttgart/Bad-Cannstatt:
Frommann/Holzboog, 1990.
DIOGENES LAERTIUS. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols,
with an English translation by R. D. Hicks. London/New York: William
Heinemann/G. B. Putnam’s sons, 1925.
GOURINAT, J.-B. La dialectique des hypothèses
contraires dans le Parménide de Platon. In: FATTAL, M. (éd.). La philosophie de Platon. Paris: l’Hartmann, 2001.
LIDDELL, H.-G.; SCOTT, R. & JONES, H. S. (1940). A Greek–English
Lexicon, 9th ed., with a Revised Supplement ed. by P.-G.-W. Glare, with the Assistance of A.-A. Thompson. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996.
LUNA, C. & SEGONDS, A.-Ph. [éds.]. Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, t. I-V [8 vols], Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007-2013.
MANSFELD,
J. Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text. Leiden/New York/Koeln: Brill, 1994.
NÜSSER, O. Albinus Prolog und die Dialogtheorie des
Platonismus. Stuttgart: Teubner,
1991.
STEEL, C. Commentaire sur le
Parménide de Platon. Traduction de
Guillaume de Moerbeke, 2 vols. Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 1982-1985.
STEEL,
C. Proclus et l’interprétation
‘logique’ du Parménide. In: BENAKIS, L-G. (éd.). Néoplatonism et Philosophie Médiévale,
Actes du Colloque
international de Corfou 6-8 octobre
1995, Turnhout 1997.
STEEL, C. Une histoire de l’interprétation
du Parménide de
Platon dans l’antiquité. In: BARBANTI, M. &
ROMANO, F. (a cura di). Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione. Atti del III Colloquio
Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca
sul Neoplatonismo. Catania: Cuecm,
2002, pp. 11-40.
STEEL,
C. Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, t. I-III, Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford/New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007-2009.
TARRANT,
H. Thrasyllan Platonism. Ithaca/London: Cornell
University Press, 1993.
[1]
Procl.
In Prm., 631.11-641.14 (See STEEL, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon; Id., Procli In Platonis Parmenidem
Commentaria; LUNA & SEGONDS [éd.], Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon.
[2] Procl. In Prm., 631.21-632.27.
[3]
On the
appropriation by Plato of the Zeno’s method in the Parmenides, see GOURINAT, La dialectique des
hypothèses contraires dans le Parménide de Platon, pp.
233-261.
[4] Procl. In Prm.,
631.20-631.36: “Καὶ γὰρ εἰωθέναι φασὶν οὗτοι τὸν Πλάτωνα ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιῤῥήσεις τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τριχῶς· καὶ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μίμησιν ὧν ἐκεῖνοι
γεγράφασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ τελειότερον μέντοι προάγοντα τὴν μίμησιν
καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα προστιθέντα τοῖς ἐκείνων λόγοις, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ πρὸς Θουκυδίδην ἀγωνιζόμενος
τὸν Μενέξενον ἀπειργάσατο, καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ ῥηθέντα λόγον ἐπὶ τοῖς δημοσία θαπτομένοις εἰς ταὐτὸν μὲν ἐκείνῳ καθεὶς, τῇ δὲ τάξει τῶν κεφαλαίων καὶ τῇ εὑρέσει τῶν ἐπιχειρήσεων καὶ τῇ σαφηνείᾳ τῆς ἑρμηνείας πολλῷ δή τινι τὸν λόγον τοῦ παρ' ἐκείνου γραφέντος εὐδοκιμώτερον ἀπειργασμένος· τὰς δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς οὓς ἀγωνίζεται, καθάπερ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸν Ζήνωνα”. See STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation
du Parménide de
Platon dans l’antiquité, pp. 11-40.
[5] Plat. Prm.
137b1-166c.
[6] Procl. In Prm.,
634.8-634-17: “Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ὡς κατὰ μεγάλα διελθεῖν, τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ κεφαλαίων,
οὕτω γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι διαιροῦσιν, ὧν ἓν μέν ἐστι τὰς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀπορίας προτεῖνον, ἓν δὲ τὴν τῆς μεθόδου σύντομον παράδοσιν ποιούμενον, δι' ἧς ἀξιοῖ γυμνάζεσθαι τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας, ἓν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν ὡς ἐπὶ παραδείγματος τοῦ κατὰ Παρμενίδην ἑνὸς γνώριμον ἀπεργαζόμενον, πάντα πρὸς ἓν βλέπειν ταῦτα, τὴν τῆς γυμνασίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄσκησιν”.
[7] See STEEL, Proclus et l’interprétation ‘logique’ du Parménide, p. 68.
[8] See also Arist. Top. I, 2, 101a34-36: “πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος”. In this passage
Aristotle states that when we are
able to develop an aporia, arguing in one way and
another, we will be even more able to discern the true from the false (κατοψόμεθα τἀλητές) in every arguments. What Aristotle here says could
represent an example of the kind of
the exercise that some authors recognised in the Parmenides; compare with the passage 136c2-5:
“καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές”. In fact, Aristotle also calls the “method” just
described as a γυμνασία: “which will make it simple to argue on the proposed
subject”; see Arist. Top.
101a28-30: “ὅτι μὲν
οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ
αὐτῶν
καταφανές ἐστι·μέθοδον γὰρ
ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ
τοῦ
προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν
δυνησόμεθα”.
Based on this parallel, the method of
the Parmenides would be superior to
that one of Aristotle because the latter in the Topics would argue on ἔνδοξα (commonly
shared opinions), while Plato in the Parmenides
would propose universal rules (καθολικοὶ κανόνες) to reach the truth. For the latter argument, see STEEL, Proclus et l’interprétation
‘logique’…, p. 72.
[9] A confirmation
of this argument would be present in Alexander of Aphrodisias,
who, commenting on Aristotle’s Topics
and referring to the γυμνασία of which Aristotle speaks, states that the description
of this method (‘which will make us able to argue on the proposed subject’)
agrees with what Plato writes in the Parmenides
in so far as: how bodily exercises made according to a specific technique provide
a good constitution to the body, likewise, the exercises in the subjects
performed by the soul are made according to a method, giving a good shape to
the soul. The good form for the rational soul would correspond to the ability
to examine (κριτική) and discover
the truth. See Alex. Aphr. In Top. p. 27,
27-31, Wallies (CAG 2.2).
[10] Plat. R. VII 537e-539d.
[11] Procl. In Prm. 648.1-658.30.
[12] See
STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation
du Parménide…, p. 24
[13] See
BALTES & DÖRRIE, Der Platonismus in
der Antike. II, pp. 48-50; NÜSSER, Albinus
Prolog und die Dialogtheorie des Platonismus; TARRANT, Thrasyllan Platonism; MANSFELD, Prolegomena.
Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text, pp. 82-89; STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation
du Parménide…, pp. 27-28.
[14] The term ‘ὑφηγηματικός’ is the opposite of the term ‘ἀπορητικός’; see LIDDELL; SCOTT & STUART
JONES, A Greek–English Lexicon.
[15] Diog.
Laert. Vit. Phil., III, 49, 3.
[16] See
STEEL, Une histoire de l’interprétation
du Parménide…, pp. 27-28. See also the reconstruction of M. Baltes, in
BALTES & DÖRRIE, Der Platonismus in
der Antike.…., II, pp. 513-520.
[17] This is because if we think at the dialectical exercise
contained in the Parmenides, it would
be natural to link this dialogue to its ‘gymnastic aspect’.
[18] Diog. Laer. Vit. phil.
III, 49.
[19] Alb. Prol. III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151,
5-7. However, it is worthy of note that Albinus himself (in the third
chapter) in the classification he makes of Platonic works puts the Parmenides among the ‘ἐλεγκτικοί’
dialogues. See Alb. Prol.
III. 14-15.
[20] Aul. Gell. Noct. att. VII,
5-11.
[21] Alc. Did. 159, 43-44.
[22] Alb. Prol. VI, 151, 5-7. See MANSFELD,
Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled…, n. 138.
[23]
The Fihrist, composed
in the 10th century by the bibliographer Ibn al-Adīm,
mentions a compendium of the Parmenides
attributed to Galenus, alongside a collection of
logical treatises (together with the Cratylus, the Sophist,
the Statesman, and the Euthydemus).