Submissão: 09/10/2019 Aprovação: 27/11/2019
Publicação: 18/12/2019
Dossiê
Filosofias da memória
Is the simulation theory of memory about simulation?
Nikola Andonovski
PhD student in Philosophy
at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
Abstract:
This essay investigates
the notion of simulation and the role it plays in Kourken
Michaelian's simulation theory of memory. I
argue that the notion is importantly ambiguous and that this ambiguity may
threaten some of the central commitments of the theory. To illustrate that, I
examine two different conceptions of simulation: a narrow one (simulation as
replication) and a broad one (simulation as computational modeling),
arguing that the preferred narrow conception is incompatible with the claim
that remembering involves the simulation of past episodes. Investigating
possible solutions, I suggest that, despite some relatively serious
consequences, the theory may be better off subscribing to the broad notion of
simulation.
Keywords:
Episodic Memory; Simulation Theory of Memory; Simulation
Introduction
Kourken Michaelian's simulation
theory of memory (STM) is slowly becoming the leading post-causal
theory of episodic memory. Put forward in the already seminal Mental Time
Travel, STM characterizes episodic memory as a kind of imaginative
simulation, performed by a cognitive system aiming to represent an episode from
one's personal past. In this brief essay, I examine the notion of simulation
and the role it plays in the simulation theory. I argue that the notion is
importantly ambiguous and that this ambiguity may threaten some of the central
commitments of STM. In section 1, I present the main features of the theory. In
section 2, I present two different conceptions of simulation: a narrow one
(simulation as replication) and a broad one (simulation as computational
modeling). In section 3, I set up the problem,
arguing that the preferred narrow conception of simulation is incompatible with
STM's representational commitments. Section 4 investigates possible solutions,
suggesting that, despite some relatively serious consequences, STM may be
better off subscribing to the broad notion of simulation.
The simulation theory of memory
The idea
that memory and imagination are intimately connected has a long history. Recent
developments in psychology and neuroscience, however, have seen a particularly interesting
variant of it rise to the fore. According to this variant, episodic memory and
imagination are operations of a single cognitive system[1]. Michaelian[2] takes his cue from these
scientific developments, aiming to move decisively beyond classical preservationist
theories of episodic memory[3]. Remembering, he tells us,
"is not a matter of encoding, consolidation, storing and retrieving
discrete representations of discrete episodes"[4]. It is, rather, a form of
imaginative construction performed by a general cognitive system dedicated to
the simulation of possible (past) episodes. According to his simulation theory
of memory:
S remembers an episode e just in case:
1)
S now has a representation R of e
2)
R is produced by a
properly functioning episodic construction system, which aims to produce a
representation of an episode belonging to S’s
personal past[5].
Prima
facie, condition (1) appears
relatively uncontroversial. Yet, Michaelian doesn't
tell us how (broadly) we should understand the notion of 'representation',
highlighting only the origin of the relevant representations[6]. If R is to be a memory of a past episode, it
has to be produced by a properly functioning episodic system. And, while the
representations produced by this system may have a particular character (format
or content), how the notion is understood essentially depends on further facts
about the system. A proper understanding of (1), thus, depends on a proper
understanding of (2).
Let's, then, move to condition (2).
STM makes much of "the growing consensus" in the recent science of
memory[7], taking
episodic remembering to be an operation of a more general cognitive
system, which underlies a number of psychological capacities. As Michaelian is well aware, however, this consensus belies an
important theoretical diversity. Indeed, the last 25 years have seen the
emergence of a variety of competing characterizations of the function and
structure of this cognitive system. Perhaps most famously, Tulving[8] takes
the system to "make possible mental time travel [MTT] through subjective
time", an activity in which the 'traveler'
maintains her sense of self over time[9]. Schacter, Addis and colleagues[10], in
contrast, downplay the importance of subjective ‘travel’ through mental time.
According to their constructive episodic
simulation hypothesis (CESH), the
general cognitive system is dedicated to the simulation of (possible)
past and future events, which involves the flexible recombination of
episodic details from previously experienced events. A related, yet importantly
different, account has been proposed by Hassabis and Maguire[11]. On
their scene construction theory (SCT), the primary
function of the episodic system is the construction of atemporal scene representations, which may be
put to different purposes: episodic remembering, imagination, spatial
navigation etc.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Michaelian's STM is not committed to any particular account
of the episodic system, opting for theoretical neutrality. The theory is
neutral in two distinct senses. First, it doesn’t take a firm stand on the
proper characterization – or indeed: explanatory centrality – of specific
computational (i.e. constructive) processes[12]. That
is to say, the simulationist doesn’t have a horse in
the race between MTT, CESH and SCT theorists. Second, and closely related, the
theory doesn’t wager on the implementational-level details of the episodic
construction system[13]. Yet, the
simulation theory "is meant to be sufficiently determinate to capture the
common core" of the new systems approaches (ibid). The common core, as
should be clear by now, is the commitment to viewing episodic remembering as a
product of a general "episodic construction" system, whose function
is not uniquely mnemonic. On the systems perspective, the identification of
relevant (or even distinguishing features) of episodic memory is inherently
tied to the identification of relevant features - computational operations,
representations etc. - of this general system.
Is the
simulation theory sufficiently determinate to capture the common core of these,
often substantially different, approaches to the study of episodic memory?
Answering this question properly requires an extended analysis of a number of
distinct components of STM. For example, the notion of "proper
function", which plays a key role in condition (2), is both complex and
sneakily multifaceted. Michaelian does not shy away
from this complexity, offering a comprehensive account that ties proper
function to reliability. Thus, on STM, a properly functioning system is a reliable system, where reliability is understood as the tendency of the
system to produce mostly accurate
representations (in normal conditions)[14]. In the
context of episodic remembering, specifically, the construction system is
functioning properly if it tends to produce accurate representations of
personal past episodes. While this proposal is undoubtedly intriguing, it is
not clear how well it jibes with the commitments of some systems theorists who
see systematic accuracy errors as adaptive features of a system attempting
to maximize rememberers' predictive prowess[15].
Similar questions surface in the analysis of other concepts central to STM,
including 'aim', 'episode' and even "personal past". And, while Michaelian has something to say about each of these
notions, the same cannot be said about the notion that lends its name to his
theory. What, namely, does the 'simulation' in "simulation theory"
refer to? Surprisingly, given its frequent use in Mental Time Travel, the
notion is not properly introduced or analyzed, even
in the sections that present the simulation theory of memory. Perhaps, then, Michaelian intends to be non-committal about the notion,
aiming for theoretical neutrality once again. But, is there a sufficiently
determinate core sense of 'simulation' shared by the new systems theories?
Indeed, what kind of process is simulation (considered to be)? What is its
relationship to imagination? Can episodes of one's personal past be genuinely
simulated, as STM proposes? Let's turn to these questions.
What is simulation?
The term ‘simulation’ has been used
in a variety of ways in the philosophical and psychological literature. In a
now classic paper, Stich & Nichols lament the overly heterogeneous use of
the concept in the mindreading debate: “the diversity among the theories,
processes and mechanisms to which advocates of simulation theory have attached
the label ‘simulation’ is so great that the term itself has become quite
useless”[16].
One can hardly be dissuaded from such a pessimistic conclusion upon analysis of
the ways in which the term has been used in the context of episodic memory.
Interestingly, however, two of the main systems theories of episodic memory -
indeed, two of the three approaches whose "common core" STM attempts
to capture - do not rely on the notion of simulation at all. Thus, the term
doesn't appear in Tulving's flagship expositions of the mental time travel view,
with simulation not being one of the 'features' of episodic memory[17],[18]. Similarly, scene construction theorists
mention the term only in passing, and only to refer to the views of their
rivals[19]. As you
may expect, then, it is these rivals - constructive episodic simulation theorists
- that are mainly responsible for promulgating the connection between episodic
memory and simulation[20]. Unfortunately, this has not thwarted the emergence
of a problematic diversity of the kind Stich & Nichols lamented. Indeed,
even in (what appears to be) the clearest exposition of the commitments of
CESH, Schacter and colleagues offer a number of different meanings of
‘simulation’, hastily, and somewhat confusingly, running them together[21]. To their credit, however, they end up settling on a
preferred meaning, characterizing simulation
as a kind of imaginative activity:
We use the term to refer to imaginative constructions of hypothetical
events and scenarios… [Simulation] involves imaginatively placing oneself
in a hypothetical scenario and exploring possible outcomes[22].
This notion of simulation roughly
corresponds to what Stich and Nichols called pretense-driven-offline-simulation[23]. When
attempting to simulate a hypothetical scenario, the subject – or rather: the
episodic system – acts on the ‘pretense’ that the
scenario is actual, exploring its features by simulating the (various) ways in which such a scenario can unfold.
It is in this sense that simulation is ‘imaginative’: it is a constructive
process that operates on the pretend
input that is fed to the system (e.g. the belief that one is ‘in’ the
hypothetical scenario).
Of course, not every process that is
pretense-driven and operates ‘offline’ is a
simulation. Simulations are, above all, epistemic
devices: they provide epistemically available processes that reflect the
relevant aspects of processes that are not epistemically available in the same
way[24]. The
purpose of simulating, in other words, is to gain knowledge about a
process/scenario that we don't have proper access to by relying on a process
that we can access. For this to be
possible, a simulation must be like the
target process/scenario in some
relevant way; it must somehow “mirror” its underlying (causal) structure. Only
in that case will the “possible outcomes” explored in the simulation be
genuinely informative and anchor our expectations about what it would be like
to experience such an event/scenario. Importantly, however, there are different
ways in which a simulation process may be “like” a target/simulated process.
Consider these two kinds of simulation, discussed by Fisher:
a.
A sophisticated computer simulation of airflow
reflects the patterns of actual airflow well enough to enable accurate
predictions of how planes will fly
b.
Aerodynamics
in a wind tunnel is sufficiently similar to aerodynamics in open air to allow
us to make predictions of how actual planes will fly on the basis of what
happens to model planes in a wind tunnel[25].
In the case of (a), the similarity
between the simulation and the simulated process is only a 'high-level',
abstract similarity. The computer models the target process by "generating
correct symbolic descriptions of its outputs from descriptions of its inputs by
means of descriptions of its intervening states"[26].
Importantly, the simulating system need not operate according to the same
principles the simulated process does; it only has to produce a correct description
of its relevant outputs[27]. In contrast, the similarity in (b) is much deeper.
The simulating process resembles the target one at a finer level of grain,
'mirroring' its basic principles of operation in advancing from state to state[28]. In
this case, the simulation is, in a sense, a replication of the target
process.
In the mindreading literature, “simulation”
is typically understood in the latter sense, as referring to a mental process
that replicates (or “duplicates”, “copies”)
another in some significant sense[29]. The reasons for this are easily illustrated. The
debate between theory theorists (TTs) and simulation theorists (STs) concerns
the way in which people reason, think and acquire knowledge about the
mental states of others. While TTs argue that we rely on a "theory of
mind" which we tacitly possess[30], STs
propose rather that we acquire knowledge about others' minds by simulating their
mental states in our minds[31]. Now,
if what is meant by 'simulation' is simply computational modelling, as in (a)
above, this would make the claims of simulation theorists much less
interesting. Indeed, on a computational view of the mind, these claims would
border on the trivial, making every representation of others' minds a
kind of simulation[32]. Simulating the mental states of others, then, must
be taken to involve replication (or 'duplication', 'copying) of their internal states,
a process which aims to resemble the target processes at a finer level of
grain.
Predictably, the same issue arises
in the context of episodic memory. So, do simulationists
about memory aim to use the narrower notion of simulation-as-replication? Or
are they content with a broader, but perhaps more problematic, notion of
simulation? Unfortunately, neither Michaelian nor
proponents of CESH discuss these issues explicitly[33]. Indeed, in their programmatic paper, Schacter and
colleagues prefer to stay "neutral with respect to the various theoretical
debates that exist concerning these related issues"[34]. Yet,
at a risk of being repetitive, it is not clear whether this neutrality is
properly earned and whether it can even be achieved. In fact, at first glance,
it seems that simulationists must be committed
to the replication view of simulation. The reasons for this claim mirror the
ones illustrated above. Simulationists put a high premium
on characterizing the specific form episodic simulations take, regularly
emphasizing the characteristic phenomenology that accompanies such simulations.
Thus, remembering is habitually portrayed as a kind of 're-experiencing' of a
past personal event or scenario. On a computer-modelling notion of simulation,
many claims of this kind will have to be interpreted quite liberally, often as
providing only a metaphorical gloss on the core tenets of simulationism.
Yet, a second glance is more disconcerting. Given some of Michaelian's
commitments in Mental Time Travel, it is not clear that the simulationist can opt for a replication view. To
illustrate this, let's turn to another relatively straightforward question.
Namely, what is it that is simulated by the episodic system, according
to STM?
Simulation of what? A problem
On the simulation-as-replication
conception, it is natural to see the episodic system as simulating past/future mental
states or processes, associated with the experience of particular episodes.
This is precisely the position Shanton & Goldman[35] develop
in their brief treatment of the issue. Indeed, the authors see episodic
remembering (and correspondingly: prospection) as a form of high-level
mindreading, where the subject places herself, as it were, "in the
shoes" of her past (and future) self. This process is straightforwardly
analogous to the re-positioning that, according to STs, accompanies the reading
of others' minds. Episodic remembering, to put it simply, is the
mindreading of one's own past mental states. Shanton
& Goldman marshal evidence for three dimensions
of resemblance “between processes involved in remembering previously
experienced events (retrieval processes) and
processes involved in the original experiences of the events (remembered processes)”[36]. Phenomenologically, remembering appears
similar to past experiences of events. This is a familiar point in the
memory/MTT literature, with remembering often characterized as a kind of re-experiencing a past event. Yet, the
similarity between retrieval and remembered processes seems to run deeper. There
are, in fact, good reasons to think that there are significant neural resemblances, with growing
evidence that brain regions involved in an original experience of an event are
(partially) reactivated when the event is later remembered[37]. Finally, Shanton &
Goldman argue that retrieval processes functionally
resemble remembered processes, citing evidence of facilitation effects
associated with the congruence of circumstances at encoding and retrieval[38]. The three dimensions of resemblance, they are adamant,
afford “fairly direct evidence for a simulational
account of memory”[39].
Michaelian[40] acknowledges that Shanton
& Goldman's account is "in tune" with his STM. Yet, he opts for a
different route, effectively sidestepping the empirical considerations offered
above:
Shanton and Goldman treat episodic memory as being a
matter of simulating one’s past mental
states, in particular. On the simulation theory, in contrast, episodic
memory enables us to simulate past episodes
in general. This represents a fundamental advantage of the present
simulation theory, for, while episodic memory is sometimes a matter of
remembering past mental states, one often remembers events as such[41].
The "fundamental
advantage" pertains to the content of
episodic memories. According to Michaelian, the
representational arrow in episodic memory is not necessarily directed inwards,
towards one's own previous experiences. It can be - and, in fact, it primarily
is - directed outwards: towards past events as such[42]. For example, in remembering my trip to Brussels from
last year, I can remember what
happened during the trip without remembering the experiences,
thoughts or feelings I had during the trip. Cases like this, Michaelian argues, illustrate that remembering is unlikely
to reduce "to reading one's own past self's mind"[43].
On STM, then, the episodic
construction system should be understood as aiming to represent episodes from
the rememberer's personal past, only some of which
may be constituted exclusively by past mental states or processes. Now, a
careful reader will notice that the shift away from Shanton
and Goldman's simulationism is a bit more dramatic
than Michaelian portrays it to be. Namely, while they
acknowledge that 'high-level' mindreading involves the simulation of mental
states which typically have propositional contents[44], Shanton & Goldman have
very little to say about the contents of episodic memories. Their emphasis is,
rather, on the process of re-enactment of past mental states, which they take
to be at the heart of remembering. In contrast, Michaelian
places the content of episodic memories at the center
of attention, linking it directly to the simulation process. Thus, in his
comment above, he doesn't talk about the process of simulation as generating
memory representations with specific contents, as one may expect from
STM's condition (1). Rather, he takes the representing process itself to
be simulational in character. Consequently, he is
able to talk about the simulation of past episodes, in a way, indeed,
reminiscent of Schacter et al.'s (2008) talk of the "imaginative
construction of hypothetical events and scenarios"[45].
Yet, on this
interpretation, Michaelian's simulation theory of
memory cannot be committed to a replication view of simulation[46]. If 'simulation' is understood in this narrow sense -
i.e. as a kind of copying or duplication - then the episodic construction
system cannot be taken to simulate past episodes/events. Remember: this notion
of simulation entails a fine-grained resemblance between the principles of
operation governing the simulating process and those governing the simulated
process/scenario. Now, there are many rival metaphysical conceptions of events,
as well as of their underlying ‘structure’[47]. But,
regardless of which conception one ultimately endorses, there is no reason to
think that the principles of operation governing episodic simulation will end
up mirroring the underlying structure of the (purportedly) simulated events. To
paraphrase Goldman[48], what
transpires in the mind when one remembers a trip to Brussels bears little
interesting resemblance to Brussels or holiday trips in general. The episodic
construction system, in short, is unlikely to produce simulated “replicas” of
personal past episodes. STM, then, seems to face a troubling dilemma: either
opt for a more liberal, but potentially excessively broad, notion of
simulation or alter the basic commitments pertaining to the
representation of past episodes. What are on the options on the table for the simulationist? And, which one of these options is most
attractive?
STM and simulation: theoretical options
The simulationist may
insist that past events, or at least some important feature of them, can
be genuinely re-enacted or replicated. There is, indeed, one obvious candidate
feature: time. Simulations of past events, just like the events
themselves, are temporally extended; they, as it were, 'unfold' in time.
Consequently, episodic remembering may be taken to necessarily involve a
fine-grain replication of the temporal organization and structure of the
remembered events. This route has been explored by a variety of contemporary
theorists. Thus, Cheng & Werning[49] suggest
that mnemonic representations are simulational in
virtue of the fact that they represent the temporal succession (in the
'micro-structure') of episodes by temporal succession in the domain of
representational vehicles[50]. Similarly,
De Brigard and Gessell[51] argue
that memory representations have a dynamic structure, unfolding in time
and, hence, 'mirroring' the temporal structure of the represented (past) events[52]. While these proposals are intriguing, it is unlikely
that they will afford a full resolution of the problem we've sketched. For one,
they only isolate one feature of events that can be replicated, a
feature that may be essential yet is clearly not distinguishing. (Note: past
mental states/experiences too are temporally extended). More
importantly, it is not obvious that temporally extended memory representations
do manage to replicate, at a fine enough grain, the temporal structure of
remembered events. They may, indeed, unfold in time, but the neural mechanisms
that support such unfolding - e.g. theta-phase precession and time cells[53] - are importantly dissimilar to the ones that anchor
the temporal unfolding of 'external' events. To reach for Goldman once
again, what transpires in the mind when one remembers an event will probably
not resemble that event in any interesting way. To that extent, representations
with a dynamic structure will not be genuine replications.
Another option is to simply follow Shanton & Goldman, taking episodic simulation to
involve the replication of past mental states/events. Given STM's
explanatory ambition, however, Michaelian would not
be keen on conceding that remembering does reduce to 'reading' one's own past
self's mind. Is there a way out? One promising route involves the separation of
the representation relation from the simulation process. Consider one tentative
variant: in episodic memory, we remember past episodes by simulating the
relevant past experiences associated with them. This "best of both
worlds" solution attempts to preserve the semantic commitments of STM -
memories are about episodes, not mental states - while not sacrificing the
evidence for mental process similarity. (Notice that, as things stand now, Michaelian is forced to jettison Shanton
& Goldman's argumentative strategy, sketched above). Moreover, such a view
has the added benefit of being compatible with a non-representational
account of simulation, which may be appealing to simulationists
of a particular bent[54].
Nevertheless, this is only a provisional, and highly schematic, proposal. A
serious simulationist account, developed along these
lines, would owe us answers to a number of tricky, yet important, questions.
What exactly does it mean to say that we remember episodes by simulating
past experiences? How is the representational relation to these past episodes
established? What does an account of this kind tell us about the representation
of future episodes? Lastly, and perhaps crucially, doesn't this modified STM -
by separating the semantic and the psychological story - steer a little too far
from its philosophical core? The devil, as always, is in the details.
Alternatively, Michaelian may simply bite the bullet and concede that
episodic simulations do not aim to replicate the fine-grained structure
of remembered events. This move towards a broader, but weaker, notion of
simulation would preserve some of the basic metaphysical commitments of STM
(most notably: the rejection of the necessity of appropriate causation in
memory). It would also allow the simulationist to
examine the representation of (past) events - i.e. the semantic story - without
excessive concern for the mechanisms or vehicles of mnemonic representation.
Indeed, this may be the "theoretical neutrality" Michaelian
is after. Yet, this solution too may come at a (potentially steep) price.
First, the simulationist would have to acknowledge
that episodic remembering involves 'simulation' only in a somewhat attenuated
sense, bracketing loose talk of 're-experiencing' the past and
'pre-experiencing' the future. Of course, STM may still appeal to the specific
format of the representations generated by the "episodic
construction" system and may even resort to considerations of a more
traditional sort to capture the character of mnemonic representations - e.g. by
invoking sensory imagery. Yet, absent a careful and extended treatment
of these ideas, the role of 'simulation' in episodic remembering remains
tenuous. This ties in to the second concern. While prima facie dialectically
satisfying, this solution may potentially clash with the positive accounts
provided by systems theories like CESH and SCT. Namely, these theories may
appeal to specific kinds of representations and operations proprietary to the
episodic system - even to simulations, in the narrow sense. If the goal
of STM is to capture the "common core" of these approaches, then for
a broad notion of simulation may not end up being feasible. In short, the
deflationary solution, i.e. simulation theory is not really about simulation, may be too deflationary.
Cards on the table.
Which one of these theoretical avenues is most promising, and appropriate, for
the simulation theory of memory? Given the explanatory ambitions of the theory,
it seems likely that Michaelian would opt for
rejecting the narrow simulation-as-replication view as simply too restrictive
(and perhaps even too committal). Indeed, despite the nod to Shanton & Goldman, I strongly suspect that STM was
never intended to be "in tune" with replication/re-enactment views of
remembering. Yet, Michaelian still owes us a careful,
and systematic, treatment of these issues. This is not for nominal purposes
only (is STM about simulation?); rather, it is necessary for a proper
understanding of some of the theory's central commitments. Here, I will briefly
mention a single issue. Importantly, STM is not content with treating episodic
memories and imaginings as mental occurrences of the same kind (as products of
a single cognitive system). Rather, the theory advances a stronger claim,
characterizing episodic remembering as a kind of imagination. Now, while
this makes for a memorable slogan, not much is offered in defense
of it[55]. In
fact, in advancing the claim, Michaelian seems to use
'imagination' to refer to the very process(es) of episodic construction - i.e.
simulation - purportedly performed by the general episodic system. In
that sense, to say that remembering is "a matter of imagining the
past" is simply to say that it is a product of such episodic simulation[56]. But,
if "episodic simulation" is to be understood broadly - i.e. as
referring to any 'offline' construction of mental representations - then
Michaelian's claim ends up not being as interesting
(or sexy) as it may appear at first glance. To put the point somewhat
provocatively: given a sufficiently broad notion of 'simulation', episodic
remembering will trivially be a kind of imaginative simulation[57].
Conclusion
In constructing his simulation
theory of memory, Kourken Michaelian
offers a curious mix of philosophical minimalism and grand explanatory
ambition. As a result, the gap between the letter and the spirit of the theory
can, at times, be uncomfortably large. In this brief essay, I tried to make one
aspect of this gap visible to the naked eye by investigating the role the
notion of simulation plays in the theory. Following the letter of the theory,
we see a stripped-down variant of the notion, catering to the sensibilities of
philosophical minimalists. Yet, the vibrant spirit of the theory pulls Michaelian towards commitments that he may not be able to
deliver on upon the backdrop of such a minimal notion. Pointing to the
different options on the table, I examined some ways in which the simulationist can close this uncomfortable gap. Choices
have to be made.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Kirk Michaelian and the anonymous referees for their generous
help with this essay.
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