THE SECOND BRAZILIAN MIGRATION WAVE:
THE IMPACT OF BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES ON CURRENT MIGRATION TO THE UK.

A SEGUNDA ONDA MIGRATÓRIA BRASILEIRA: O IMPACTO DAS MUDANÇAS ECONÔMICAS E SOCIAIS NO BRASIL SOBRE A MIGRAÇÃO CONTEMPORÂNEA PARA O REINO UNIDO.

LA SECONDE VAGUE MIGRATOIRE BRESILIENNE: L’EFFET DES CHANGEMENTS ÉCONOMIQUES ET SOCIAUX AU BRESIL SUR LA MIGRATION ACTUELLE VERS LE ROYAUME-UNI.

LA SEGUNDA ONDA MIGRATORIA BRASILEÑA: EL IMPACTO DE LOS CAMBIOS ECONÓMICOS Y SOCIALES EN BRASIL SOBRE LA MIGRACIÓN CONTEMPORÁNEA HACIA EL REINO UNIDO.

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ABSTRACT: This article explores the effects of Brazil’s recent economic growth and the narrowing of the inequality gap on the second Brazilian migration wave to the UK over the last two decades. Migration-related research has emphatically argued that this ongoing international mobility results from transnational networks developed by pioneers who encouraged fellow citizens to travel. Although this paper considers social networks as an important factor shaping the movement of Brazilians abroad, we propose to debate contemporary Brazilian migration by shedding light on the national socio-economic policies implemented since the late 1990s. Thus, through a rigorous literature review of Brazilian transnational migration studies and multi-sited ethnography in Brazil and London, we focus particularly on how the opening up of the Brazilian economy to international capital flow, and the implementation of social programmes followed by the enlargement of its domestic consumer market, helps to explain the current increase and diversification of Brazilians abroad.

Keywords: Brazilian migration; migration social networks; economic reforms; social welfare programs; United Kingdom.

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RESUMO: Este artigo explora os impactos do recente crescimento econômico e da redução da desigualdade social no Brasil na segunda onda migratória brasileira para o Reino Unido nas últimas duas décadas. Estudos migratórios têm, enfaticamente, defendido que esta mobilidade internacional, ainda em curso, seria resultante de redes transnacionais estabelecidas por pioneiros capazes de conectar novos migrantes. Embora este artigo considere tal argumento um importante fator para compreender a migração contemporânea brasileira, propomos aqui refletir como as políticas socioeconômicas nacionais implementadas desde o final da década de 1990 também intensificaram essa circulação. Assim, através de uma rigorosa revisão bibliográfica sobre estudos focados em redes migratórias brasileiras e de uma etnografia multi-situada no Brasil e Londres, destacamos particularmente como a abertura econômica brasileira ao fluxo de capital internacional e a implementação de programas sociais, acompanhado pela expansão do mercado interno, ajudam a compreender o atual aumento e diversificação de brasileiros no exterior.

Palavras-chave: migração brasileira; redes migratórias; reformas econômicas; programas sociais; Reino Unido.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article explore les conséquences du développement économique et de la réduction des inégalités au Brésil sur la seconde vague migratoire vers le Royaume-Uni au cours des deux dernières décennies. Les études sur les migrations ont tout particulièrement insisté sur le fait que cette mobilité internationale, toujours en cours, serait le fruit de réseaux transnationaux mis en place par des pionniers capables de faire venir d’autres migrants à leur suite. Tout en reconnaissant l’importance d’un tel facteur pour comprendre les mouvements migratoires brésiliens contemporains, cet article propose de montrer comment les politiques socioéconomiques nationales mises en place depuis la fin des années 1990 ont, elles aussi, participé à l’intensification des circulations. Ainsi, à partir d’une étude bibliographique des publications portant sur les réseaux migratoires brésiliens, et en se basant sur une enquête ethnographique multi-située au Brésil et à Londres, ce travail entend montrer comment l’ouverture économique brésilienne à des nouveaux flux de capitaux internationaux et l’implantation de programmes sociaux, joints à la croissance du marché interne, aident à comprendre l’augmentation et la diversification actuelle des brésiliens à l’étranger.

Mots-clés: migration brésilienne; réseaux migratoires; réformes économiques; programmes sociaux; Royaume-Uni.

RESUMEN: Este artículo explora los impactos que el reciente crecimiento económico y la reducción de la desigualdad so-
cial en Brasil han tenido sobre la segunda onda migratoria brasileña hacia el Reino Unido en las últimas dos décadas. Los estudios migratorios han enfatizado firmemente que esta movilidad internacional, aún en curso, sería el resultado de redes transnacionales establecidas por pioneros capaces de conectar nuevos migrantes. Aunque este artículo considera tal argumento un factor importante para comprender la migración contemporánea brasileña, nuestra propuesta reflexiona acerca de cómo las políticas socioeconómicas nacionales implementadas desde finales de la década de 1990, también intensificaron esa circulación. Así, a través de una rigurosa revisión bibliográfica de estudios enfocados en redes migratorias brasileñas y de una etnografía multisituada en Brasil y Londres, destacamos particularmente como la apertura económica brasileña al flujo de capital internacional y la implementación de programas sociales, acompañados de la expansión del mercado interno, ayudan a comprender el actual aumento y diversificación de la migración brasileña en el exterior.

**Palabras clave:** migración brasileña; redes migratorias; reformas económicas; programas sociales; Reino Unido.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

I think that Brazil gave good opportunities to different social classes to travel abroad in recent years. Before, there were no people like those [referring to the Brazilian working class in London] who could afford a flight ticket. When you think about this, I believe the improvement of our economy and the changes in our society are behind this! You know what? These changes also promoted facilities to open small travel agencies like mine. With a small amount of money, a computer and the internet you could start this business (Romulo, fieldwork note. Brazil, January 2012).

From his office chair, Romulo highlights how the economic and social transformations in Brazilian society over the last two decades enabled him to open a small travel agency in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, and sell flight tickets to working class Brazilians to move abroad. For some of our respondents in London, Romulo was the travel agent who had sold them the tour packages to migrate. In
2013 he agreed to talk to us about the current changes in his profitable market and his customers. In the last two decades, Brazil has, in fact, become a country where a considerable number of the population are moving abroad. According to the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brazilian Ministry of External Relations) (2012), it is estimated that roughly 2.5 million Brazilians were living outside the country in 2012. And 118,000 of these were living in the UK alone (MRE, 2012). This significant number of Brazilians living abroad has caught the attention of migration studies, especially since 1998, and they have termed this ongoing movement the second Brazilian migration wave. This article aims to analyse how the constitution of the so-called second wave of Brazilian migration has been shaped by the economic and social changes that Brazil has experienced since the early 2000s.

On analysing this second wave of migration, empirical findings have suggested that from the late 1990s the Brazilian population abroad diversified in terms of social class, gender and regional origin (Ribeiro, 1998; Martes, 2011). Before the 2000s most Brazilian migrants were portrayed as young, male, middle-class and predominantly from southern and southeastern states – the richest parts of the country. After 2000, migration from the less privileged central and northeastern regions started to increase as well as the numbers of working-class Brazilian migrants (Ribeiro, 1998; Martes, 2011; Torresan, 2012). Attempting to explain the reasons behind the transformation in the profile and volume of Brazilians abroad, the literature suggests that the massive flow of Brazilians during the first Brazilian migration wave (1980-1990) produced migrant pioneers who settled in the host societies and soon developed social and economic structures that provided support for the less well-off migrants to move and be accommodated in the host society (Siqueira, 2009; Kubal, et al. 2011). Social network analysis, therefore, has been largely used by scholars of Brazilian migration to understand not only what motivates Brazilians to emigrate, but also their reasons for choosing particular destinations, how the Brazilians behave when they arrive in the host country, and how social ties provide facilities and benefits during the displacement process (see Fusco, 2005; Padilla, 2006a).
Although we consider the constitution of social networks to be an important factor shaping the migration of Brazilians to the Global North, we argue that in order to understand and contextualize the migration of Brazilians abroad, it is worth paying attention to how the increase and diversification of this population was also made possible by the recent economic and social transformations experienced in Brazil since the late 1990s. Such structural factors tend to be neglected in the majority of the studies which focus their analyses on the constitution of social networks. Thus, while avoiding economic or structural determinism and generalization, this article stresses that it is still important, for the purposes of migration studies, to take into account the structural conditioning of the sending societies and its specific temporality (Martins Jr, 2016). By contextualizing Brazilian migration to the UK within the economic, social and political context, we can not only better comprehend the formation and increase of social networks, but also the changes in the profile of this population living in the UK, in terms of class and regional origin in Brazil (Martins, Jr 2014; Martins Jr and Dias, 2013; Evans et al., 2011).

Aiming to critically engage with the discussion on migration and social networks, this article contributes to the field of Latin American (and specifically Brazilian) studies and migration studies by drawing attention to the economic and social transformations in Brazilian society over the last two decades. It particularly explores the impact of the measures taken by the Brazilian government to open up the national economy in the late 1990s, along with the economic and programs in social welfare of the early 2000s, which provided the structural conditions that facilitated the constitution of the social networks and increased Brazilian migration to the UK. Such argument comes from two ethnographic studies; the first took place between 2010 and 2014 in Minas Gerais, Brazil and London, while

1 As argued by Angelo Martins Jr, when analyzing Brazilian migration to London, it is important to take into account “the structural conditionings of the sending and host societies as well as […]its specific temporality”. By contextualizing the migration process “within the economic, social and political context – of both societies, it is therefore possible to understand various structural constraints” which “sets up the stage on which migrants’ journeys are performed, which is also shaped by other, individual, sets of factors” (2016, p.92). However, for the scope of this article, we focus here only on the Brazilian structural (social, political and economic) changes that shaped the so-called second wave of Brazilian migration.
the second took place between 2012 and 2016 in London. Interviewees were mainly selected through the snowball technique, which enabled us to access a large number of Brazilians in both countries (17 + 33), including three travel agents who were responsible for the mobility of some of our respondents into the UK. The interview design followed an in-depth semi-structured format.

2 THE SECOND BRAZILIAN MIGRATION WAVE AND THE ACADEMIC APPROACH

Studies on Brazilian migration stress that the second wave of international mobility was directly related to the first wave produced by the “Lost Decade”. According to the literature, Brazilians saw the United States, Japan and European countries as providing a temporary financial solution while Brazil was in an economic crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s. “[...T]hey view themselves as sojourners in this country, as temporary visitors here to work for a sliver of the American economic pie to take back with them to Brazil” (Margolis, 1994, p. xx, translated by us). These migrants were mainly identified as middle class, accepting blue collar work in tertiary services and industries in order to provide support to their relatives back in Brazil (Padilla, 2006b; Sasaki, 2006; Torresan, 2012).

So engineers, teachers and businessmen decided to move abroad and work in menial jobs for between 3 and 5 years to pay their debts, educate their sons and/or make enough money to buy a house or start a business in their home town. By the middle of the 1990s, the number of Brazilians living in countries such as the UK, Portugal, Italy, Spain, the USA and Japan was estimated to be over a million (Focus Migration, 2012). That became known among scholars as the first Brazilian migration wave, a massive movement mainly driven by economic purposes.

Apart from being mainly white workers, studies have pointed out that the first wave was also composed of a large number of Brazil’s...
younger population who saw in the crisis an opportunity to improve their professional skills abroad. This was the case for Brazilians in the UK. In the early 1990s the Brazilian migrant community mostly consisted of students or young people who went to the UK for a couple of years to learn English and travel across Europe (Torresan, 1995; Cwerner, 2001; Kubal et al., 2011). According to Angela Torresan, they did not know “what expect from the future in Brazil. They did not know how to plan and execute anything that was not threatened by the uncertainty of the country’s future. They saw their lives’ project breaking and freezing successively and thus travelling abroad represented the best available option” (1995, p.11 translated by us). Going to the UK, therefore, was considered as a good opportunity for Brazilians to improve their cultural capital by studying English and academic studies and travelling across Europe, as the Lost Decade was producing a gloomy social and economic environment for them in Brazil.

Nevertheless, researchers point out that many of these migrants never returned to Brazil. Known as the pioneers, instead they settled and invested in businesses and services for Brazilians in the host societies, creating familiar meeting places, such as restaurants, shops, non-government organizations and Brazilian churches which further attracted new waves of migrants (Kubal et al., 2011; Martins Jr and Dias, 2013). Margolis (1994), Martes (1999), Sales (2005) and Tsuda (2003), for instance, reveal that after a period in the receiving country, while some of these pioneers returned home, others prolonged their stay, resulting in a slow process of settlement. But settlement takes place amid a process of changing practices. “They become more reluctant to put in long hours or continue to hold down a second job. […] As more and more immigrants go through this process, a community of sojourners is transformed into a community of settlers” (Margolis, 1994, p.275, translated by us). Hence, temporariness turned into a slow process of settlement for many Brazilian migrants who had left Brazil because of the “Lost Decade” and its impact on their standard of living.

In this context, contemporary studies of Brazilian migration have explored the process of return and settlement produced by the
first wave as the main hypothesis to explain why the still-massive movement of Brazilian migration has continued to gain force in the last decade (Soares, 2002; Siqueira, 2009; Assis, 2008; Fernandes and Castro, 2013). The literature incorporated the social network analyses to explain this second wave, an approach which offered a new angle from the previous studies strongly oriented by the economic crisis of the Lost Decade in the 1980s (Tilly, 1990; Massey et al., 1993; Levitt, 2001; see also Goza, 2004; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; and Glick Schiller, 1995; 2004). They argued that the pioneers provided an incentive for more people to migrate and, thus, gradually built up transnational social networks which facilitated the movement of further migrants. From personal ties, informal gatherings, parties, and a few clubs and shops where Brazilians used to hang out with each other in the late 1980s there has been a gradual transformation into a vibrant and lively network of non-profit organizations, churches, business establishments, and media that has ensured the continued movement of Brazilians between both countries (Bloch et al., 2009; Rocha and Vasquez, 2014; Sheringham, 2011; Kubal et al., 2011).

Another important point revealed by the current literature is that the second wave is made up mostly of Brazilians from the working class (Padilla, 2006a; Machado, 2011; Bakewell et al., 2015). As reported by the literature on this international movement, the departure of the first wave of pioneers to industrialized countries in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s blazed the trail of transnational networks for other Brazilians – mainly from working and lower middle class backgrounds – to follow in growing numbers (Padilla, 2006b; Malheiros, 2007). Empirical studies have argued that these informal ties that connected migrants, returning migrants and non-migrants in different spaces through kinship and friendship enabled a rapid growth in the Brazilian population in cities of the Global North, including London (Kubal et al., 2011; Brightwell, 2012; see also Bloch et al., 2009; Patarra, 2005). “The risks and costs of movement for subsequent migrants are lower because there is a group of ‘experts’ already in the receiving country to greet new newcomers and serve as their guides” (Levitt, 2001, p.08). Examples of assistance provided by the informal
social networks include: providing money to finance the migrants before and after migration, accommodation, food, job information and putting them in touch with other migrants while they are getting used to the new country (Bakewell et al., 2015).

Although the literature clearly shows the role of these social ties in facilitating the unexpected transnational movement of Brazilians from the lower social strata, it still does not provide a strong historical context that can explain Brazil’s economic and social changes in the last two decades and to what extent this has contributed to the ongoing migration wave. A thorough review of the Brazilian migration literature uncovers only a few studies which give attention to this fact (Padilla, 2006a; Bakewell et al., 2016). Researching Brazilian women in Portugal, Beatriz Padilla, for instance, briefly mentions a few economic measures that put Brazil into this era of globalization, but, nonetheless, maintains her focus on the social networks as the reason for the migration:

In addition to the traditional pull-push factors, it is possible to identify other elements that are consequences of globalization, including credit facilities to travel, cheaper air fares, fast circulation of information about not only tourism but also about employment opportunities in other countries, especially in those countries where there were already immigrants from the country of origin. This last element, emphasizes the importance of social networks for migration, which is the main aspect of this paper. Using a different name, Massey (1990) has named this “circular and cumulative causation” of migration (2006a, p.4, our emphasis)

Despite the fact that the social network approach looks appealing for examining migration, it does not address the significant economic and social changes in Brazil in the last two decades in explaining the presence of Brazilians from the working and lower middle classes in the second wave. We, on the other hand, argue that the measures taken by the Brazilian government to fight inflation, work for economic stability and reduce poverty must be addressed in
any research committed to examining this particularity in the international mobility. Therefore, in the next section this paper explores the economic, political and social welfare reforms executed by the Brazilian government from the late 1990s onwards and reveals how they have impacted the present Brazilian migration wave to the UK.

3 BRAZIL IN THE LATE 1990S AND 2000S: FROM UNREGULATED MARKET REFORMS TO WELFARE PROGRAMS

The 1990s marked the triumph of neoliberal economic policies and globalisation in Latin America. The old paradigms of development through import substitution industrialisation (ISI), in a closed economy setting, with a large role for the state, were jettisoned in favour of an open economy for the state, with an exit of the state through massive privatisation and the predominance of market forces. (Amann and Baer, 2002, p.945).

The above quote from Edmund Amann and Werner Baer (2002) sums up the political and economic changes that Latin America went through in the 1990s, including Brazil. With its national economy desperately in need of international capital inflows following the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the international moratoria declared by former president José Sarney to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986, Brazilian policymakers found themselves under strong pressure to accept the prescriptions of multilateral international financial institutions. This process was backed by the major industrial countries and the principal creditors of the region (Ianni, 2000; Lenardão, 2008; Amann and Baer, 2002). Although President Collor initiated neoliberal political reforms in the early 1990s, during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration (1995-2003) Brazil witnessed a rapid programme of economic liberalization. Under the discourse of Modernization⁴, Cardoso and his cabinet focused on replacing the Brazilian foreign policy agenda dominated by the logic of autonomy

⁴ According to Octavio Ianni (2000), the modernization claimed by the Cardoso administration was contradictory as it was framed by a “stillness” condition, which was mainly down to a conservative pact between his party and very conservative social and economic segments of Brazilian society who had historically been in power. “These oligarchies had ensured socio-political bases, and obviously economic support, to the coalition committed to the neoliberal globalization of the Brazilian economy” (2000, p.59).
via distance, which guaranteed the state control over the economy, with a new proactive international agenda, determined by the logic of autonomy through integration of the national economy with the global market (Fonseca Jr, 1998; Vigevani et al., 2003; Talavera and Pinto, 2008). The intention was to end the foreign policy established by the military dictatorship in the Cold War (1964-1984), which had attempted to control the national territory through political and economic isolation, and intensify the country’s connections to the new global order through an unregulated market (Fonseca Jr, 1998).

Brazil followed a set of ten strict economic policies, the so-called Washington Consensus that had been prescribed by Washington DC and monetary institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department in 1989. According to these institutions, the economic policy prescriptions were a necessary reform package for crisis-wracked developing countries. These market reforms carried out by the Cardoso administration mainly focused on five economic and political steps in order to balance the government’s budget: 1) stabilizing national inflation through drastic fiscal adjustment; 2) privatizing state-owned enterprises, both in the industrial and public utility sectors5; 3) trade liberalization, which consisted of pronounced declines in tariffs, and especially non-tariff protection to attract foreign investments; 4) outsourcing public services; and 5) stimulating compensatory public policies to replace universalism programmes, which sharply declined with the economic reforms (Amann and Baer, 2002; Lenardão, 2008). For example, Werner Baer (2001) notes that one amendment to the constitution eliminated any differentiation in the legal status of domestic and foreign firms. This meant that international capital was allowed to enter sectors from which it was previously excluded, such as oil exploration and telecommunications.

The most notable achievement in the 1990s was the attainment of price stability shortly after the introduction of the Real Plan. In early 1994, the economic stabilization created by the Real Plan during the presidencies of Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Cardoso, was able to put

5 The privatization program was launched by former president Fernando Collor de Mello, but a feature of Cardoso’s administration was the deepening of selling state-owned enterprises through the controversial Programa Nacional de Desestatização – PND (The National Privatization Program).
an end to three decades of rampant inflation. Moreover, the Real Plan also implemented a strong national currency “the Real” which unexpectedly gained value against the US dollar due to large capital inflows in late 1994 and 1995. As the World Trade Organization (1996) stated, the major macroeconomic achievement was the reduction of inflation from an annual rate of nearly 2,500% in 1993 to 20% in early 1996.

However, one of the most striking disappointments of the 1990s was the anaemic growth performance of the national economy. The literature stresses that such poor administration was caused not only by the rapid market reforms of the government (see Amann and Baer, 2002; Vigevani et al., 2003) but also by successive world economic crises in unregulated market economies to which the Brazilian economy was already well-tied and so was also affected (the Mexican financial crisis in 1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Argentine debt crisis in 1998 and the Russian financial crisis in 1998). This process also resulted in low Brazilian public investment at the beginning of the neoliberal policy reforms in the early 1990s. As a consequence, the poor economic performance was accompanied by rising unemployment and the growth of the informal economy with a reduction of the share of labour in the national income from 50 per cent in 1980, to 40 per cent in the mid-1990s (Lenardão, 2008).

According to Amann and Baer (2002), Brazil would recover a moderate public investment in infrastructure between 1994 and 1998, but this was not sufficient to bring positive results for the Brazilian population as a whole. “The average yearly growth rate in the 1990s was 1.8 per cent which was lower than the average growth rate in the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s which stood at 3.03 per cent” (2002, p.950). In part, the authors argue, the poor output performance of industry could have been due to the increasing import penetration which forced domestic enterprises to cede market share to overseas producers. Another point raised by the authors is the performance of the investment to GDP ratio which declined in the early 1990s, before slightly recovering in the second half of the decade. This stands in surprising contrast to the massive growth in foreign direct investment. “This curious paradox may be partially explained
by the fact that about 40 per cent of foreign direct investment was
destined for the purchase of (the existing) assets of state enterprises.
It can also be explained by the fact that public sector investment
continued to be relatively marginal” (2002, p.951).

Apart from the country’s anaemic growth, the unregulated
market reforms also did not resolve Brazil’s traditional social prob-
lem – its distribution of income. Aiming to sort out these issues,
subsequent presidents from the Labour Party, Lula (2003–2006,
2007–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014, 2015-2016)6, attempt-
ed to invest massively in infrastructure and implemented social
programmes designed to reduce poverty and historical income in-
equality in Brazilian society. However, these two governments did
not abandon Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies. Rather, they main-
tained the international agenda for the relative economic stability
produced by the Cardoso administration and continued to attract
foreign investment (inflation targeting, a flexible exchange rate and
a tight control on inflation). However, social programmes also re-
ceived increased funding and visibility from the government.

Among these social programmes, we highlight Minha Casa,
minha Vida (My Home, My Life)7, Fome Zero (Zero Hunger)8, and Bolsa
Família (Family Allowance)9. As Ana Fonseca et al. (2013) stress, the
Labour Party aimed to promote a massive welfare-state programme
in order to reduce poverty and eradicate hunger in Brazilian society10. Its

6 Dilma Rousseff has been removed from office following her impeachment trial as more than
two-thirds of the Upper House, voted for her ouster on 31 August 2016. Since then, Michel Te-
mer, her vice-president, has assumed the presidency without any legitimacy. Although keeping
the appearance of legality, the impeachment has widely been recognized as a “parliamentary
coup d’etat” orchestrated by a powerful coalition of conservative politicians, business associa-
tions, segments of the federal bureaucracy and the media.
7 A massive public housing programme was launched by the Brazilian Federal Government in
March of 2009. The programme dealt with the nationwide housing deficit and addressed the de-
mands of the growing middle class by helping low to middle income families finance home pur-
chases through the state-owned bank – Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Savings Bank).
The programme offered low interest rate loans to home buyers of up to 10 times the minimum wage.
8 This was the social programme that successfully managed to end hunger in Brazil.
9 This programme provided cash payments to poor families in exchange for the enrolment
of their children at school, with additional allowances for food and cooking gas for poor households.
10 It is important to state that the positive economic performance and the social welfare policies
promoted by both the Lula and Rousseff administrations took advantage of the so-called 2000s
commodities boom, which occurred during the first two decades of the 2000s (2000–2014),
following the Great Commodities Depression of the 1980s and 1990s (Antunes, 2015). This
economic boom was largely due to the rising demand from emerging markets, particularly Chi-
na, during the period from 1992 to 2013. The prices of raw materials sharply rose, and this
allowed significant profits for Latin American countries, including Brazil, whose trade balance

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social programmes almost gained universal status: “the Bolsa Família program has been extended to 11 million families, almost tripling its scope. The minimum wage increased by 57% in real terms between 2002 and 2010, reaching the highest level since the early 1970s, with the so-called ‘Brazilian Miracle’, and that meant a significant increase in wages and consumers” (2013, p.409, translated by us).

In addition, statistical data (Graphic 1) reveal that the percentage of Brazilians living in poverty dropped “gradually in the 1990s and more rapidly in the most recent decade, from close to 35% of the population in 1992 to 18% in 2007” (Wogart, 2010, p.390). The chart below illustrates the percentage of the Brazilian population living in poverty from 1992 to 2014. It can be seen that the percentage fell sharply from 25.4% to 8.6% in the last decade. On the other hand, Jan Peter Wogart (2010) points out that the middle class who comprised only 15% of the Brazilian population in the early 1980s sharply grew to nearly a third of the country’s 190 million inhabitants during the same period. This meant that more than 60 million Brazilians were taken out of poverty. By boosting domestic demand, these policies also contributed to economic growth.

**Graphic 1: Brazilian poverty rate (1992-2014)**

(Source: FGV- Ministry of Finance 2013).

Along with social programmes, the Labour Party administration also launched the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC* (Growth Acceleration Programme), in 2007. This programme aimed was strongly supported by agribusiness and the mining industry. So the Brazilian government saw in the profits generated by the extractive industries the opportunity to keep investing in social programmes to reduce poverty.
to promote the resumption of initiatives in social infrastructure, urban planning, logistics and energy for Brazil, contributing to its economic development. Moreover, the PAC also aimed to increase jobs and generate income, through public and private investment. “In its first four years, the PAC helped to double the Brazilian public investments (1.62% of GDP in 2006 to 3.27% in 2010) and helped Brazil generate a record number of jobs – 8.2 million jobs created in the period” (Ministério do Planejamento, 2015, para.3, translated by us).

João Sicsú (2013) notes that the positive global economic scenario in the early 2000s alongside the right decisions of the “leftist” governments in boosting infrastructure investments were responsible for decreasing casual work in Brazilian society. Between 1995 and 2002, the Cardoso administration created 5 million formal jobs, while in the Lula period this number more than tripled with 15.3 million formal jobs. According to Sicsú, the Lula administration inaugurated a new phase in terms of the generation of formal jobs in the country. Graphic 2 confirms this, showing that unemployment dropped sharply from 12.2% in 2003, to 9.3% in 2007, and finally to 6.8% in 2010.

**Graphic 2:** Brazilian unemployment rate (1984-2014).

(Source: Sicsú, 2013).

So, through economic transformations aimed at opening the national economy to foreign investment, followed by the strong implementation of social programmes in the last two decades, Brazil-
ian society witnessed the unexpected growth of its lower stratum in parts of the consumer market which were previously excluded. In this context, sections of the working class and lower middle class gained the access and means to become avid consumers. These groups were seen by the Brazilian government as promising consumers who could keep the internal production of goods and services constantly fuelled (Yaccoub, 2011; Borges, 2013). These social classes were now able to consume new goods, such as home appliances, furniture, electronics and automobiles, as well as air travel.

4 THE POPULARIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL IN BRAZILIAN SOCIETY

International tourism, in particular, was increasingly accessed by Brazilians in the 2000s. Credit facilities to travel, feasible package tours, and access to credit for travel agencies were all part of the government’s strategy to encourage the consumption of this commodity and, thus, maintain the growth of the domestic economy. International tourism, in this context, became very popular with the Brazilian working and lower middle classes, as air fares became cheaper and there was a greater presence of international air companies in the 2000s (Franco, 2012; Borges, 2013). As stated earlier, due to higher income levels and the greater availability of credit to purchase flight tickets, the working and lower middle classes began to access travel more frequently. “The potential customers of this social group also began to acquire domestic and international travel packages and this stems from the cheapening of the cost of travel and instalment opportunities” (Borges, 2013, p.81, translated by us). This finding can be corroborated by numbers presented by the ANAC (National Civil Aviation Agency). As reported by this official agency, the number of Brazilians travelling abroad grew 62% between 2000 and 2010, when it reached 5.3 million (2015). In agreement with this, the Ministry of Tourism observed that these numbers were directly related to the emergence of the new middle class over the last two decades.
The increase in average income and consumption of households, and the emergence of a new middle class in Brazil are a unique opportunity to strengthen this market with recognition of tourism as an important factor of economic and social development. At a time when new products enter daily in the consumer agenda of Brazilians, travel can and should be included in this list, increasing domestic consumption as well as fuelling the economy (Ministry of Tourism, Brazil, 2013, p.34, translated by us).

In fact it was not uncommon to find studies that “show how the Brazilian emergent social classes are travelling more abroad, joining international tours and even cruises on sophisticated vessels” (Yaccoub, 2011, p.217, translated by us). Tourist spots in Europe and the United States were no longer places only visited by the Brazilian elite. So, for this Latin-American society, international travel became a product of contemporary life par excellence among different Brazilian social classes from the 2000s onwards. (Talavera and Pinto, 2008). Being part of a global world and having the chance to enjoy its lifestyle became a reality for different social segments of the country. Consequently, the movement of Brazilians around international airports started increasing from 2004, “with the exception of 2009, the year of global economic crisis, which in turn also affected the segment of world tourism” (Borges, 2013, p.97, translated by us). Between 1995 and 2012 there was an increase of 193% in Brazilian travel out of the country, as Graphic 3 shows:

**Graphic 3:** Brazilian output abroad.

(Source: Borges 2013).
More than ever, international tourism for Brazilians became one of the main modes of accessing global cities such as New York, Paris, London, Barcelona and Lisbon. However, our respondents in Brazil and London revealed that the wider availability of air fares and opportunities for travelling abroad also influenced those Brazilians willing to migrate.

5 THE SECOND WAVE OF BRAZILIAN MIGRATION TO THE UK

From the late 1990s onwards, international migration clearly became an important phenomenon in Brazilian society. It is estimated among scholars that around 1.3 million Brazilians migrated during this period (Patarra, 1996). In fact, we can observe that the projected numbers are matched by the first official records produced by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the Brazilian consulates and embassies, in 1996. According to the Brazilian government, the total number of Brazilians registered abroad was about 1,419,440 in 1996, rising to 1,887,895 in 2000 and 2,041,098 in 2002, with a slight decline in 2003, when 1,805,436 Brazilians were registered as living abroad (Table 1).

Table 1: Brazilians living abroad 1996-2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1996 Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2000 Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2001 Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2003 Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>580,196</td>
<td>40.87</td>
<td>799,203</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>894,256</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>713,067</td>
<td>39.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>454,501</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>369,839</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>17.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>262,944</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>224,970</td>
<td>11.92</td>
<td>262,510</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>269,256</td>
<td>14.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>135,591</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>197,430</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>332,164</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>291,816</td>
<td>16.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>90,709</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>211,791</td>
<td>11.22</td>
<td>182,329</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>121,297</td>
<td>12.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,419,400</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,887,895</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>2,041,098</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,805,436</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2012).

In 2012, almost a decade later, “Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that 2,521,576 Brazilians lived outside Brazil” (Schrooten et al., 2015, p.6). Furthermore, the same Brazilian Ministry stated that the main destination countries for the second Brazilian migration wave were the same places as in the late 1980s: the
United States, Japan and European countries, as outlined in Table 5 (Malheiros 2007, Margolis 2013). The table below (Table 2) shows the midpoint of estimates of the size of the Brazilian population in any given continent, as accurate numbers are difficult to come by, particularly due to the intense international movement of Brazilians and because in some countries many of them were undocumented.

Table 2: Brazilians living abroad in 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1,102,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>752,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>369,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>29,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>25,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>6,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,521,576</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2012).

Currently, the United Kingdom is the European country with the third largest number of Brazilians. Based on numbers confirmed by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012), there are roughly 118,000 Brazilians living in the UK. After Portugal (140,426) and Spain (128,238), traditionally the main destinations for Brazilians, the UK is the country with the highest Brazilian population in Europe. The presence of Brazilians in the UK has been expanding since the 1990s and particularly accelerated in the 2000s11. In fact, it turned Brazilians into a noticeable migratory group in the UK (Evans et al., 2011; Vertovec, 2007).

Despite the fact that a few studies have highlighted how the economic crisis in Europe pushed Brazilians back to Brazil (Albuquerque, 2012; Fernandes and Castro, 2013), the movement of Brazilians to the UK is still intense. As stated by Kubal et al. (2011, 11 It should be pointed out that the second Brazilian migration wave to London was also strongly related to the events of 9/11. After the terrorist attacks, the established migration routes connecting Brazil to northeast United States – traditionally a main migration destination for Brazilians – became less popular in favour of new destinations, among them, London (for further information see Dias, 2015 and Schrooten et al., 2015).
p.05), the official UK figures on flows between 2007 and 2010 “reveal that Brazilians continue to come to the UK. In 2007 and 2008, there were 7,040 and 7,715 entry clearances granted, respectively. In 2009 only 5,880 Brazilians were allowed to enter the UK, and in the first quarter of 2010 only 1,275 Brazilians were admitted”. This data can be seen in Graphic 4, below.

**Graphic 4:** Brazilians in the UK (Indexed, 2008=100, 2008*56,000).

(Source: Kubal et al. 2011).

As a consequence of the recent increase in the Brazilian population in the UK, Brazilians currently represent a significant new migrant group in London whose presence contributes to the extensive diversification of migration movement to the city, leading Vertovec (2007) to coin the term ‘superdiversity’. However, as the literature on Brazilian migration to the UK observes, the contexts and meanings behind the migration have altered over the years (Torresan, 1995; McIlwaine, 2011; Martins Jr and Dias, 2013). Following a similar pattern to the migration to Portugal (Bakewell et al., 2015), there is a difference between earlier flows from Brazil that happened in the 1980s and more recent ones exerted by globalization. While the first wave in the 1980s comprised predominantly the middle class, the second wave tended to be categorized as the working or lower middle classes who took advantage of access to the consumer market,
allied with the popularization of international air fares and package
tours, to move to the UK. Such changes were similarly noted by our
participants, during the fieldwork, as was the case with Laerte.

Laerte was one of the travel agents interviewed in Minas Ge-
rais, Brazil. He stresses that the travel agencies in his Brazilian region
were strictly connected to migration from the middle of the 1990s. ‘It
was always different over here. The majority of our customers were
not people interested only in short trips, they rather wanted to spend
years in the United States or in the UK seeing and experiencing what
they could not have over here.’ According to Laerte, Brazilian migra-
tion grew considerably ‘in the last decade when it became afforda-
able to travel to Europe and to the United States. I can tell you that
happened because of the facilities like access to credit cards that the
[Federal] government provided. It somehow favoured travel abroad’.

This observation was shared by two other travel agents –
Clarice and Romulo – also interviewed in Minas Gerais. Romulo
particularly highlights that since the 2000s the majority of his clients
have been working and lower middle class travellers.

Well, Brazil has changed a lot since I left in the 1990s. In the 2000s,
when the [migration] boom started, it became very easy to buy a
tour package and travel to cities like London or New York. Particu-
larly at that time, when the dollar was lower than the real, access to
credit cards was easier and tour packages could be paid in feasible
instalments. These all attracted clients with this [low-income] pro-
file to my travel agency.

In the same vein, Clarice says that the beginning of the 2000s
was the busiest time ever. She recalls that at the beginning of the
1990s the number of people in her town – Rio do Paranaiba – in
Minas Gerais who wanted to travel abroad was very small compared
with the 2000s. She observes ‘there was not such possibility. Only
people with money could travel abroad. Tourism was the only pur-
pose. People living on a low income, like me, who wanted to migrate
used to move to [Brazilian] capitals like Belo Horizonte or Brasilia.
But in the last ten years, travelling abroad has become easier and more popular for us’.

In her town in Minas Gerais, Carmo do Paranaiba (29,000 inhabitants), for instance, there were seven travel agencies operating at the same time due to the high demand for international package tours. ‘It was a boom of travel agencies over here. The number of small travel agencies opening [...] was huge in 2000. There was a clear demand for our services’. Clarice underlines that international travel became more accessible for the local population. “I think that the country [Brazil] gave ideal opportunities to different social classes to travel abroad in those years. But it also promoted facilities to open small travel agencies like mine. With a small amount of money, a computer and the internet you could start this business”. Returned migrants started investing in travel agencies in order to meet a high demand of tour packages among locals who wanted to migrate to the Global North. “Well, we combine business with our own knowledge...” This particular excerpt of the interview is quite revealing as it shows us how the migration networks produced by returned migrants – travel agents – have been sustained by the national socio-economic policies implemented in Brazilian society since the late 1990s.

Sharing the same point of view as Romulo, she affirms, she affirms that ‘with not so much money, people could go to abroad. There was different possibilities to buy a flight ticket and leave. And those who wanted to sell his/her knowledge could open a travel agency. The national economy was stable.’ People wanted to take the opportunity to travel abroad. She adds that ‘was possible to visit and live for while in European cities like Lisbon and London...’

Despite a wide range of reasons given for migrating to the UK, our respondents shared a common view that the easy access to credit cards, feasible package tours and the increased availability of international low-cost flights were determinant elements in facilitating their international mobility. Moreover, the image of potential tourists from an emerging economy also contributed to apply for a visitor visa. Pedro, a Brazilian interviewed in Carmo do Paranaiba,
believes that “Brazilians are very welcomed in these countries. We as tourists spend a high amount of money over there, and they like it! Everything is expensive here [Brazil]… and Brazilians go to spend money and buy goods in the United States or London”. Similarly, Valeria, another respondent interviewed in London, describes how travelling as a tourist helped her to get into the UK.

I flew from Brazil to Porto and then to London. That was in the early 2000s... it was 2004! I remember there were many Brazilians going as a tourist to Europe and they were welcomed. So, I decided to do the same. Of course, that was not my own idea. I know people who did the same. [...] In Porto, I could hear Brazilians speaking in every corner... and it was easy to recognize Brazilians in the street, right? The way we dress, walk... In London, it was the same. I saw a lot... well, you know like here on Oxford Street. I could see Brazilian walking here and carrying bags! [...] then I think about your question... and it makes a lot of sense. Many Brazilians migrated to here [London] due to the economic and politic changes we lived in Brazil... I believe everyone was very optimistic, wasn’t it?

12 In fact, Brazilians as a tourist became welcomed in countries with with tough immigration laws. Between 2004 and 2011, for instance, the number of Brazilian tourists in the United States quadrupled. The Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo shows that, in 2012 alone, 1.8 million Brazilians visited that country. In Miami, for instance, there were 690,000 tourists, while New York received another 816,000. “One out of every 13 tourists who went to Manhattan was Brazilian, in 2012. Brazilians spent around $1.9 billion (R$ 3.6 billion), putting our country [Brazil] in third position of those who spent the most there, behind the UK and Canada. With goods costing less than a third of the value in Brazil, 95% of Brazilians visiting the United States are shoppers, according to the report of Usitic, the international trade committee of the country, released this year.” (Folha de São Paulo, 20/04/13).

13 It is worth mentioning that this practice of travelling as a tourist is not particular of the second migration wave. It is actually registered in studies on the first wave. Maxine Margolis (1994), for example, observed that travelling, as a tourist was common practice for Brazilians who wanted to travel to New York at that time, when international travel was limited to elite travelers. However, according to more recent studies, with the wider availability of air fares and international travel among Brazilians, the role played by travel agencies expanded considerably (Fazio and Rios-Neto 2008, Togni 2014, Dias 2016). They, for instance, show that many other services apart from the tour packages were included. Among them, I highlight bogus documents, the practice of intermediating money remittances, and even establishing considerably expanded links with coyotes. In cities such as Governador Valadares, the demand for these services reached such magnitude that the number of travel agencies sharply increased in a very short space of time, and expanded their services to other Brazilian regions, including Alto Paranaiba.
At first, these pieces of interviews show us how Brazil’s economic expansion and the opening up of travel opportunities produced a good image of Brazilians tourists. However, Pedro and Valéria also reveal how these international travels cannot be reduced to tourism or even long-term tourism. They also lead to international migration.

Natalia, another respondent interviewed in London, reinforces this argument. She explains that going abroad was understood by her as ‘the chance to leave that mediocre future. I did not want that for me. You know, I could experience something different. So…what I did? Got my savings and bought a package tour. I could afford that. It was 2005…our currency was stronger in relation to Euro and Pounds.’ According to her, ‘the Brazilian economy helped those who wanted to go abroad and live in places like the United States, London and Portugal. We could afford a package tour in installments payments, and arrive with some euros or pounds in the pocket to start our lives.’ Natalia continues and explains that London was her final destination. ‘It has always been my first dream. I grew up watching movies and cartoons about English fairy tales, learning English…So, my package tour took me first to Lisbon. I stayed there for three days. It was a such marvelous experience!! Then I landed in London.’

Similar findings also came from the interviews conducted with Adriano and Robson, two other correspondents in London. Excerpts from their interviews below reveal how the popularization of international air alongside access to credit card\(^\text{14}\) enabled these two Brazilians to travel to London. Adriano remembers that he was able to purchase his flight tickets with a credit card. He explains that in 2006 his mother ‘finally got a credit card from our local branch. And that helped us to buy my flight tickets and get some money to be used during my travel […]'. It facilitated a lot, because we did not have to borrow money from relatives’. Robson, in the same vein, says that he and his friends saw

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\(^{14}\) After the process of privatization in the late 1990s, many regional banks were no longer committed to serving the government. Thus, they had to popularize their services among the population. Financial credit was the main one. The feasibility of cheaper instalments was part of the government's strategy to encourage the purchasing power among the population and, thus, maintain the growth of the domestic economy. In 1998, therefore, Brazilian society faced a huge expansion of financial credit for small entrepreneurs. The governmental purpose was clear: to expand the internal consumer market. In the following years there was a wide campaign promoted by Brazilian banks to popularize the use of credit cards among their customers. It was no wonder that it had a strong impact on the number of Brazilians from the emergent middle class travelling abroad.
package tour promotions in his town, Minas Gerais, as the chance to travel and work in Europe. He adds that they ‘saw the chance of going abroad to work and see the world as a proper Brazilian tourist rather than from magazines or soap operas. I had friends living in Spain and in England. So, my intention was to spend time with them’. After visiting his friends in Madrid, Robson and his travel companions headed to the United Kingdom. He recalls that they quickly adapted themselves to the dynamic of this global city and its vibrant nightlife. ‘That was crazy. We worked very hard in those busy restaurants around Leicester Square, shift after shift. We were young and could work intensively to pay the travel, save some money and, of course, spend it in clubs, pubs and buying goods.’

So, the unregulated market reforms followed by social welfare programs, previously explored, together with economic growth, enabled millions of Brazilians to access goods and products, but also services such as tourism that would have been previously unimaginable. The growing airline competition and the popularization of low-cost airlines promoted by the Brazilian government led to the budget optimization of the economy class from the late 1990s (Codourey, 2008). This context, as revealed by the travel agents in Minas Gerais and migrants in London, facilitated the international mobility of Brazilians to the UK over the last two decades. In this sense, it was the recent structural changes that Brazil experienced that played an important role in the migration process, and not just the fact that Brazilian migrants were part of a social network which provided them with information and support in the migration process.

6 CONCLUSION

In this article we have analysed how the constitution of the so-called Brazilian second wave of migration was shaped by the economic and social changes that Brazil experienced from the late 1990s. In an aim to counter the economic push-pull perspective present in most of the literature on Brazilian migration in the 1980s and early 1990s, current studies have tended to adopt a theoretical framework based
on social networks in order to examine the second wave of Brazilians from the late 1990s onwards. This approach avoided a macro perspective and, therefore, an economist perspective on the subject, bringing into the analysis the role played by social structures in the migration process (Truzzi, 2008; Fazito and Rios-Neto, 2008). Thus, ties, actors, nodes and transnational networks were some of the keywords that soon started to be part of the vocabulary of research focusing on contemporary Brazilian migration. Moreover, this approach enabled a diversification of studies. Themes such as gender, family, social class, religion, and food habits, among others, gradually enriched the debate about the second wave of Brazilian migration. However, since then, the singular historical context experienced by Brazilian society has been neglected in most of the literature on Brazilians abroad.

As this article has revealed through a rigorous literature review supported by interviews conducted with Brazilians in London and returned migrants in Minas Gerais, the economic and social changes produced by the various Brazilian governments contributed to the constitution and increase of social networks between Brazilian migrants, impacting the transformations in the profile of Brazilians living abroad. Since the middle of the 1990s Brazil experienced changes which restored connections with the global market, and saw improvements in the infrastructure of telecommunications, information systems and transportation. Moreover, these transformations were followed by socio-economic policies which ensured continually higher minimum wages, and new access to credit which created a sustained rise in popular consumption, and an expansion of the domestic market that finally, after a long drought, created permanent formal jobs (Anderson, 2011). The combination of faster economic growth and broader social transfers not only helped to achieve the greatest reduction in poverty in Brazilian history, but also provided the technological and economic conditions for the social networks to ensure the transnational movement of people, goods and information (Castells, 1996; Urry, 2000; 2007).
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